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MORE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR NATIVE
AMERICAN CULTURAL PROPERTY THROUGH
REGULATION OF EXPORT
Antonia M. De Meo*
Brothers, - You see this vast country before us, which the Great
Spirit gave to our fathers and us; you see the buffalo and deer that
now are our support. - Brothers, you see these little ones, our
wives and children, who are looking to us for food and raiment;
and you now see the foe before you, that they have grown insolent
and bold; that all our ancient customs are disregarded; the treaties
made by our fathers and us are broken, and all of us insulted; our
council fires disregarded, and all the ancient customs of our
fathers; our brothers murdered before our eyes, and their spirits cry
to us for revenge. Brothers, these people from the unknown world
will cut down our groves, spoil our hunting and planting grounds,
and drive us and our children from the graves of our fathers, and
our council fires, and enslave our women and children.
- The Prophecy of Metacomet
Let us now not also take their past from them ....
L Introduction
Cultural property provides cultural, religious, historic, artistic, and scientific
information about its creators and the context of its creation2 Often it forms the
* J.D. and Environmental Law Certificate, 1994, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and
Clark College; B.A. in Art History and American Studies, 1989, Wellesley College.
The author dedicates this article to her grandmother, Mrs. Orpha E. Basinger, who celebrates
her one hundredth birthday at the time of this publication. The author admires Mrs. Basinger
because she continually, even at age 100, strives for greater knowledge and learning. The author
thanks Kristine Olson Rogers for her thoughtful advice and comments. The author is grateful to
Ms. Rogers for her mentoring, support, and positive feedback which gave the author the
encouragement she needed to make this article and law school a successful experience.
1. THoMAs E. SANDERS & WALTER W. PEEK, LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 249
(1973). Metacomet was one of the sons of Osamekun, Massassoit of the Wampanoag Nation,
who gave the Plymouth colonists the land now Massachusetts and Rhode Island. After Massassoit
Osamekun died, the English conferred on Metacomet the title of Prince Philip. He attempted to
keep peace between colonists and Native Americans, but unrest resulted in a war named for him,
King Philip's War. The war ended in 1676 when Metacomet died. With the end of this war,
organized Native American resistance in New England also ended. Id. at 248-49.
2. Recognizing that the modern concept of property is a European creation, the term "cultural
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
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national patrimony of its creators and offers invaluable information to others.
It is a basis of communication between different cultures because it speaks in
a universal language and tells the story of past civilizations. Most people and
governments generally agree that cultural property deserves protection and
preservation and that it is tie responsibility of national governments to oversee
this protection? However, governments disagree on which types of cultural
property should be protected and preserved, who should control it, and at what
expense it should be protected.
One aspect of the international controversy surrounding cultural property
protection and preservation concerns export regulations. Many art-rich, third
world countries have strict export regulations or total export prohibitions, while
art-poor, importing countries encourage free trade. The United States is in the
midst of this controversy because we are both a major art importing nation and
a nation incurring significant loss due to the pillaging of Civil War and Native
American sites.4 Traditionally our laws have supported free trade.' However,
recently Native Americans have effectively lobbied government to gradually
change our laws to offer more protection to cultural property. Still, we have no
express export regulations. Some recent laws effectively limit export in
particular circumstances involving criminal activity.' This is a good start, but
more should be done if we intend to preserve our cultural heritage for future
generations.
II. Background
A. Definition of Cultural Property
Cultural property encompasses a variety of objects in many different sizes,
shapes, and forms. For example, it may be baskets, pottery, masks, tapestries,
property" is used in this article to denote resource, item, object, heritage, artifact, etc., generally
and interehangeably unless otherwise specifically defined in the discussion. "Cultural property"
is not intended to imply property law concepts and "cultural resource" is not intended to imply
natural resource law concepts. The author hopes that Native Americans do not take offense at the
use of any of these imperfect terms.
3. See Earle A. Partington & Yves-Louis Sage, The American Response to the Recovery of
Stolen and Illegally Exported Art: Should the American Courts Look to the Civil Law?, 12
CoLtJM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 395 (1988).
4. See Aaron Sugarman, The Treasures of America... Looted!, COND9 NAST TRAvELER,
July 1992, at 81, 85, 120; Derek V. Goodwin, Raiders of the Sacred Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1986,.l 6 (Magazine), at 65.
5. Karen S. lore, The Illicit Movement of Art and Artifact: How Long Will the Art Market
Continue to Benefit From Ineffective Laws Governing Cultural Property?, 13 BROOK. J. IN'71L L.
55, 80 (1987).
6. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA), Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat.
721 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa to 470mm (1988)); Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 3001-3013, 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990)).
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sculptures, or engravings.7 There is no universally accepted definition! It may
be described as archaeological resources, antiquities, artifacts, art, cultural items,
cultural resources, objets d'art, or relics.' Generally, it is anything exhibiting
physical attributes assumed to be the results of human activity.'" Within the
broad scope of cultural property, however, are objects which are invaluable to
particular groups of peoples because of their cultural or religious significance.
These objects represent the cultural heritage of their creators and are in fact the
cultural patrimony of these people. They offer their creators' descendants a
"tangible connection to their cultural history,"" provide inspiration for
creativity, and offer a means of communication between different peoples.'2
[C]ultural property is the product and witness of the different
traditions and of the spiritual achievements of the past and is
thus an essential element in the personality of the peoples of the
world ... it is indispensable to preserve as much as possible,
according to its historical and artistic importance, so that the
significance and message of cultural property become a part of
the spirit of peoples who thereby may gain consciousness of
their own dignity ......
Most civilizations have some form of cultural patrimony. For Americans
an example is the Liberty Bell, 4 for Greeks the Elgin Marbles,'" for Israelis
7. 1 LYNDEL V. PRoTr & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE, DiscovERY
AND EXCAVATION 149-87 (1984). This chapter, titled "Content of the Archaeological Heritage,"
examines many different types of cultural property and explains the significant characteristics.
See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234,
reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289, 289 (1971) (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. See also the implementing
legislation enacted in 1983, Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Acts, Pub. L. No.
97-446, 96 Stat. 2351 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988)).
8. 1 PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 7, at 7. For a discussion of cultural heritage, see id. at
7-11.
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 432 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2), (6) (1988); 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1)
(1988); 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (Supp. 11 1990); UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1.
10. Lorrie D. Northey, The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979: Protecting
Prehistoryfor the Future, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 61, 63 (1982) (quoting ROBERT C. DULNNELL,
SYSTEMATICS IN PREHISTORY 117 (1971)).
11. Jore, supra note 5, at 57-58.
12. 1 PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 7, at 8.
13. Id. at 9 (quoting the Preamble to the 1968 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the
Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works).
14. John H. Merryman & Albert E. Elsen, Hot Art: A Reexamination of the Illegal
International Trade in Cultural Objects, J. ARTS MGMT. & L., Fall 1982, at 5, 8 [hereinafter
Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art].
15. The Elgin Marbles are carvings from the Parthenon which were removed and taken to
Great Britain in the 1800s. The Greeks repeatedly demand their return, and controversy surrounds
the rightful ownership of these precious objects. KARL E. MEYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST 170-80
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the Dead Sea Scrolls, 6 for Hungarians the Crown of St. Stephen." These
are extreme and popular examples, but not all cultural patrimony is so easily
identifiable to the public. Often outsiders consider the cultural patrimony of
foreign cultures to be collectible art - a commodity to be traded for profit
in loth licit and illicit markets." This is precisely the situation Native
Americans face: many of their cherished patrimonial objects, including Zuni
war gods, Hopi ceremonial masks, and Iroquois wampum belts, are traded in
the international art market, thus scattering them throughout the world in
museums and private art collections. 9
B. Protection of Cultural Property During War and Peace
Throughout history objects and sites of cultural significance have been
pillaged and desecrated. In times of unrest it was common practice for
conquerors to pillage their enemy's property. One French commander
commented that, "[a]ntiquity is a garden that belongs by. natural right to those
who cultivate and harvest the fruit."' Napoleon was famous for his
pillaging; in fact, the Louvre in Paris is filled with art looted from
neighboring occupied countries."' Yet, for as long as looting has occurred,
it has been condemned, at least by the pillaged countries.
It was not until the mid-eighteenth century that the law gradually began to
recognize the importance of preserving cultural property.' Over the next 150
years protection of cultural property and preservation of all peoples'
inalienable rights to their cultural heritage became fundamental principles to
international regulation of armed conflicts.' Unfortunately, these principles
had little effect on curtailing actual looting during war times. In World War
II the Nazis systematically plundered public and private cultural property
throughout Europe. But then, in 1945, international laws were actually
(1973); 1 JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAw, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 4-13
(1987) [hereinafter I MERRYMAN & EISEN, VISUAL ARTS].
16. MEYER, supra note 15, at 183.
17. Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 8.
181. See generally MEYER, supra note 15, For a discussion of recent disputes over
controversial objects of art and cultural patrimony, see Collectors or Looters?, ECONOMIST, Oct.
17, 1987, at 117.
19. Michael Haederle, War Gods are Finally at Peace, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at El;
Marilynne S. Mason, Ceremonial Masks Return Home, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 12, 1991,
at 14; Robert Suro, Zunis' Effort to Regain Iddls May Alter Views of Indian Art, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1990, at Al; Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 65-66.
20. MEYER, supra note 15, at 64-65.
21. lit at 65; see also I MERRYMAN & ELSEN, VISUAL ARTS, supra note 15, at 15-19
(reprinting CECIL GOULD, TROPHY OF CONQUEST 13, 30, 41-43, 48 (1965)).
22. I MERRYMAN & ELSEN, VISUAL ARTS, supra note 15, at 14; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Refleclions on Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural Property, 10
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 281, 288 (1983).
23. Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 289.
24. Id. at 292; 1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, VISUAL ARTS, supra note 15, at 20-22 (reprinting
[Vol. 19
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enforced, and several major Nazi war criminals were prosecuted for this
pillaging. The destruction of cultural property was finally established as a war
crime.'
A recent example of international concern for cultural property during war
times occurred in 1991 during the Gulf War, when the United States and
allied forces used "smart bombs" to carefully avoid cultural and religious
targets in the Middle East.' In an interview with Peter Jennings for ABC
News, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf explained that pilots were required
to incur greater risks by flying at lower altitudes to increase precision "in
order to avoid destroying these religious shrines... [and] minimize damage
of this nature."'  (Interestingly, while the United States expended great
efforts, both human and financial, to preserve our enemy's sacred sites and
cultural property abroad, no such equal efforts are expended at home to
preserve Native American sacred sites and cultural property from desecration.)
Curtailing pillaging during peaceful times is arguably even more
problematic than curtailing it during times of war because it is private
individuals rather than nations that sponsor the looting and desecration of
cultural property. Public perception of the danger to cultural property is
greater during war times because the destruction is often more visible and
public opinion is easily swayed against the enemy. However, during peaceful
times enforcement is more difficult. There is an elaborate subculture of
pothunters digging for artifacts, trafficking for profit, and effectively avoiding
law enforcement.! Frequently damage to cultural property is not discovered
I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 29,
55-56, 58-60 (1948)).
25. Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 293; 1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, VISUAL ARTS, supra note 15,
at 22-23 (reprinting 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL (1948)). Currently the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict governs the protection of cultural property
during conflicts. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 (1956) (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)) (often referred to as the 1954 Hague Convention). For
discussion of related international laws, see Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 294-96.
26. In response to a critical human rights report after the war, the Foreign Office issued a
response that "[tihe allies ... went to great lengths to avoid civilian, cultural and religious
targets." Michael Binyon, GulfAllies Blamed for Needless Civilian Deaths, THE TIMES (London),
Nov. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MAJPAP File.
27. World News Tonight with Peter Jennings: Special Edition (ABC News television
broadcast, Jan. 27, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript File; see also Walter V.
Robinson, U.S. Bombs Oil Pumps to Fight Spill, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1991, at
National/Foreign 1.
28. See Bassiouni, supra note 22, at 298.
29. Ann M. Early, Profiteers and Public Archaeology: Antiquities Trafficking in Arkansas,
in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY?
39 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed., 1989) [hereinafter WHOSE PROPERTY?]; Spencer P.M.
Harrington, The Looting of Arkansas, ARCHAEOLOGY, May-June 1991, at 23.
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immediately, and the public is unaware of the amount of damage or the value
of tie objects and sites destroyed?" Additionally, damage may occur from
"innocent" sources, including natural conditions, environmental pollution,
urban development, and fanning." But it is damage caused by looters that
is the most disturbing and towards which our laws are directed. 2 (See figure
1). However, because looters are often members of the local community
stealing under the guise of recreational archaeology or treasure hunting, the
public often does not view their activities as damaging or illegal.3
C. International Art Market and Its Effects on Native Americans
The growth of the international art market contributes to public
misconceptions concerning cultural property. Attending auctions has become
a so-ial event, and museums promote art to the public through extravagant,
well-publicized, exhibitions. Furthermore, auctions have encouraged and
publicized record prices for art. The postwar art boom is said to have begun
in Paris in 1952 when a Cezanne painting sold for the equivalent of over
$94,000 at auction.' By 1961 over $2 million had been paid for a sculpture
at auction. As prices continued to rise, art became a popular investment.
Fortune magazine concluded as early as 1955 that art "can be the most lucrative
30. Early, supra note 29, at 48; see also James A.R. Nafziger, Comments on the Relevance
of Lmv and Culture to Cultural Property Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INrL L. & CoM. 323, 328 (1983)
(arguing in favor of increased public consciousness and education).
Even Native American cultural property owned by the government is not exempt from damage
due to ignorance or lack of concern. In 1987 auditors for the Interior Department's inspector
general concluded that many irreplaceable artifacts managed by the National Park Service were
"rusting and rotting" or "stored in conditions that invite theft or deterioration .... subject to
mildew, excessive humidity, freezing and insects." Furthermore, records were inaccurate or
missing. Jack Anderson & Joseph Spear, U.S. Heirlooms Missing, Audit of Parks Shows,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 6, 1987, at 52, available in Westlaw, PAPERS database.
Additionally, in 1990 the Interior Department discovered that hundreds of objects in their own
offies had been stolen and mishandled. Apache baskets were used as trash cans and planters,
and Navajo rugs were nailed to walls and used for floor coverings. A total of 162 art objects are
missirg and presumed stolen. Philip Shenon, Interior Department Says 357 Pieces Are Missing
From Its Art Collection, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1990, § 1, at 8.
These reports are particularly disturbing. One may expect mishandling from criminals, but
not from government officials entrusted with caretaking. Clearly cultural property should be
returned to Native Americans who cherish it and will properly care for it in accordance with
culture and tradition.
31. Grace Glueck, Should Trade in Ancient Artifacts Be Restricted?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1984, at C13.
32. Paul R. Nickens, The Destruction ofArchaeological Sites and Data, in PROTECTING THE
PAST 73, 76-77 (George S. Smith & John E. Ehrenhard eds., 1991).
33. Early, supra note 29, at 40. Early's article examines the subculture of pothunters in
Arkansas in detail.
34. MEYER, supra note 15, at4. Foran in-depth history of the modern art market, see PETER
WATSON, FROM MANET TO MANHATTAN: THE RISE OF THE MODERN ART MARKET (1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/2
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investment in the world. 3 Some believe the market may have finally peaked
in May 1990, when a Van Gogh painting sold for $82.5 million and a Renior
painting sold for $78 .1 million at auction.s Most o wonderis this
overwhelming increase in the prices paid for art that has singularly resulted
in tremendous amounts of desecration, destruction, and theft of art and
artifacts throughout the world.' In fact, the total value of art and artifacts
internationally trafficked has risen to over $1 billion annually, second only to
narcotics traffiking2' With so much money at stake it is no wonder that an
international black market for art and artifacts thrives.
39
35. MEYER, supra note 15, at 3-4.
36. Godfrey Barker, Gloom at the Top Hammers Art Profits. DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 17,
1991, at 1; Dominic Loehnis & Nicholas Farrell, Picture Looks Grim for Art World Collectors
Hold Their Breath as Auction Tests Collapsing Market, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 3,
1991, at 3; see also WATSON, supra note 34, at 25-26; Maggie Malone & Kideko Takayama, A
Japanese Buying Spree: The Tycoon Who Spent $160 Million at Auction, NEwSWEEK, May 28,
1990, at 75.
Sadly, Newsweek reported that the Japanese businessman who purchased these paintings plans
to warehouse them for as long as 10 years. Id. Two weeks earlier, the New York Times had
reported that, according to the businessman's bidder, the paintings would eventually be in a
Japanese museum. Rita Reif, $82.5 Million Van Gogh Sets Auction Record, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 1990, at AI.
37. MEYER, supra note 15, at 5-6; see CULTURAL PROPERTY ADVISORY COMM., LOOTING,
THEFT AND SMUGGLING: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 1983-1993, at 23,
25 (1993) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE].
38. James A.R. Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19
INT'L LAW. 835, 835 (1985) (citing PETER WATSON, THE CARAVAGGIO CONSPIRACY (1984)).
39. ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 37, at 25.
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'Looting of cultural property in the United States is out of control.
Pothunters systematically destroy vast acres of public and private land
searching for valuable artifacts. Many of our public parks bear scars from this
looting.' The region suffering the greatest amount of damage is the
Southwest, where Native American sites are prime targets for pillaging."'
The effects of this pillaging are dramatic: "Looted sites are unmistakable:
littered with smashed shards of Indian pottery, thousand-year-old pueblo walls
reduced to refuse piles, scattered beer cans, and plastic garbage bags."42 In
their quest for artifacts, pothunters often dig up Native American human
remains and leave the skeletons scattered on the ground.4" This destruction
is horrific, inhumane, and intolerable to anyone concerned with preserving the
dignity and culture of Native Americans. One commentator wrote:
Every archaeological site is like a time capsule, and each contains
in varying degrees unique evidence about our past. When such a
time capsule is destroyed, either by a looter or a bulldozer, the
loss is total. One cannot grow another Indian mound. And yet,
the tempo of destruction is presently so great that by the end of
the century most remaining important archaeological sites may
well be plundered or paved over. We face a future in which there
may be no past beyond that which is already known and
excavated. Or equally sad, what is left may be so ruinously
mutilated as to afford only a forlorn fragment of a vanished
legacy.
Experts have concluded that the recent interest in Native American artifacts
is due to the increased popularity of Native American art in the international
market. In 1971 the first major auction of Native American art was held in
New York City. Record prices left the art world stunned, perked the interest
of investors, caught the attention of pothunters, and resulted in a modern wave
of destruction to Native American sites.4 Prices for Native American
cultural property have since skyrocketed. A Mimbres pot recently sold for
$88,000 at auction,. three ceremonial masks for almost $40,000, and an
40. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 85, 120.
41. Id. at 81. For a discussion of desecration of Navajo, Zuni, and Abenaki sites, see
Deborah L. Nichols et al., Ancestral Sites, Shrines, and Graves: Native American Perspectives
on the Ethics of Collecting Cultural Properties, in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note 29, at 27.
42. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 82.
43. Id. at 84-85. When the author discovered skeletal remains left scattered by pothunters,
he carefully reburied them. Id.
44. MEYER, supra note 15, at xii-xiii.
45. Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 65.
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Alaskan hair ornament for $46,000.f7 The highest price paid at auction for
a Native American artifact is $522,500 for a Navajo man's wearing blanket.
This blanket is now considered to be worth over $1 million. Although not
all objects are worth this much, the increase in price is still significant and
provides sufficient incentive to pothunters and investors. In 1991 an art dealer
explained that baskets worth $100 two years ago, may now sell for $300, and
are estimated to be worth $1000 in two years.49 Annual sales for Native
American art and artifacts in the international black market has been estimated
at $25 million, with primary markets in Japan and Europe, specifically
Germany."
This increase in the monetary value of Native American cultural property
is not a blessing to Native Americans. Many of the objects bought and sold
in the art market are patrimonial objects, and Native American culture,
religion, and tradition require that they remain in the possession of Native
Americans to be used for cultural and religious purposes." To Native
Americans, religion and culture are inextricably intertwined. 2 Without their
cultural patrimony and religious icons, Native Americans cannot perform
essential religious and cultural rituals. As a result, they believe their societal
health suffers, their existence is threatened, and the future of their heritage is
doomed.' To Native Americans the looting of their cultural patrimony is
both destructive and sacrilegious' Furthermore, the objectification of their
sacred objects into objets d'art in the international market is insulting and
disturbing.55
47. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 124.
48. Danielle A. Warnes, Law May Boost American Indian Art, USA TODAY, May 16, 1991,
at 4B.
49. Id.
50. Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 84; PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ART 18 (1983). General statistics regarding the international black market in art are
difficult to obtain. Neither the International Foundation of Art Research nor the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's National Art File compile statistics beyond their own files. Authores telephone
inquiries to International Foundation of Art Research and Federal Bureau of Investigation,
National Art File, in Washington, D.C. (July 8, 1993).
51. See Suro, supra note 19, at Al.
52. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD Is RED (1973) (explaining Native American religion and beliefs
in comparison to Christianity); see, e.g., id. at 247; see also Vine Deloria, Jr., Sacred Lands and
Religious Freedom, NARF LEGAL REv. (Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Summer
1991, at I (vol. 16, no. 2).
53. Steven Platzman, Objects of Controversy: The Native American Right to Repatriation,
41 AM. U. L. REV. 517, 519-21 (1992); DELORIA, GOD Is RED, supra note 52, at 297-98. Deloria
explains that to Native Americans healing is a ceremonial practice, a form of religious experience.
Religion, culture, community, land, and healing powers are all essential, related elements to
Native American existence. Id.
54. Nichols, supra note 41, at 29; Vine Deloria, Jr., A Simple Question of Humanity: The
Moral Dimensions of the Reburial Issue, NARF LEGAL REv. (Native American Rights Fund,
Boulder, Colo.), Fall 1989, at 1 (vol. 14, no. 4).
55. See generally Nichols, supra note 41; DELORIA, GOD Is RED, supra note 52, at 248;
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A typical example of desecration to Native American cultural patrimony
is the theft of Zuni war gods. The Zunis carve war gods each year during
special religious ceremonies. "Each [war god] serves as guardian for the tribe
until he is relieved by a new one, and then the old ones must remain there,
contributing their strength until they go back to the earth."' Zunis believe
that if the war gods are removed from their places they will play tricks, such
as cause sicknesses or earthquakes. Unfortunately, since the nineteenth
century, war gods have been collected by scholars and museums as beautiful
art objects." During the past decade the Zunis have successfully campaigned
for the return of many of their precious war gods. They have retrieved most
war gods held by American museums and collectors, but there are still others
held abroad in Europe. Even with the publicity surrounding the return of
many war gods, still, three more were stolen in December 1990.
Proper export regulations are needed to prevent other war gods from being
sold and trafficked internationally because once war gods are possessed in
foreign countries, it is nearly impossible for Zunis to retrieve them. By
passively allowing Zuni war gods and other Native American patrimonial
objects to be internationally traded, the federal government indirectly threatens
Native American existence. The loss of a patrimonial object or sacred site for
Native Americans is the same as the loss of a religious icon for Catholics or
the Holy Lands for Israelis. 9 Yet, this Native American loss has so far been
ignored by the federal government.
D. Preservation Concerns
It: is a national embarrassment that "[flor every dollar spent on the
acquisition of art, less than a penny is spent for its preservation."'  One
expert wrote:
The next fifty years - some would say twenty-five - are going
to be critical in the history of American archaeology. What is
recovered, what is preserved, and hoW these goals are
accomplished, during this period will largely determine for all
time the knowledge available to subsequent generations of
Americans concerning their heritage from the past.6
Deloria, Sacred Lands, supra note 52, at 1.
515. Suro, supra note 19, at Al (quoting Pesaneio Lasiloo, Zuni lieutenant governor).
57. Id,
58. Haederle, supra note 19, at El. War gods have sold for $40,000 in the United States and
ae estimated to be worth $80,000-$100,000 in Europe. Id.
59. For other familiar comparisons to Western and Biblical culture and religion, see Deloria,
Sacred Lands, supra note 52, at 3-5.
60. MEYER, supra note 15, at 80.
6 . Id. at 201 (quoting Dr. Charles R. McGimsey Ill, director of Arkansas Archaeological
Survey). This prediction was made almost 25 years ago, yet history is already sadly proving the
author's insight correct. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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Part of what is needed to ensure the protection of cultural heritage is more
governmental recognition and action to solve the problem.62 One possible,
and perhaps necessary, solution is effective, express export regulations to
protect cultural patrimony. These regulations should be inclusive enough to
protect cultural heritage without unduly restricting benign art trade in crafts
and duplicate objects. However, cultural patrimony must be defined and
identified by the cultural group which it represents. Thus, our government
needs to work together with the sovereign Native American tribal
governments to ensure that their cultural patrimony is preserved for future
generations of Native Americans.
With this background of the controversy concerning the protection and
preservation of Native American cultural property, this article will now turn
to a discussion of the theoretical bases to our laws and then to a discussion
of the actual protections offered by our laws.
III. Theory
Laws regulating cultural property represent the government's best attempt
at curbing activities perceived to endanger cultural heritage.' The problem
of adequately protecting and preserving Native American cultural heritage is
a complex one. The government must balance the interests of several often
ideologically opposed parties: Native Americans, who desire control over their
heritage; archaeologists and scientists, who desire information and knowledge;
the art community (including museums, auction houses, gallery owners, and
individual collectors) which desires profit and free access to the world's art
treasures; and international governments, who desire beneficial trade
relations. In order to fully understand America's position regarding Native
American cultural property and its preservation and protection, it is important
to consider the perspectives of each interested party. Our laws represent an
attempt by legislators to balance these conflicting interests into an integrated
solution. However, so far the solution has not been wholly successful: the
62. The Cultural Property Advisory Committee recently acknowledged that "the United
States of America must continue to lead the world in protecting and preserving the cultural
heritage of all people. The world's cultural resources are finite and non-renewable and should be
treated with the same respect and concern that we show for our natural environment." ADVISORY
CoMMIrrEE, supra note 37, at 2. However, with respect to protecting Native American artifacts
the Committee recommended only that the government use diplomatic pressure to encourage other
art importing nations to adopt the UNESCO Convention. Id. at 10. See infra part IV.A.3
(discussing the UNESCO Convention).
63. John E. Peterson, II, Dance of the Dead: A Legal Tango for Control of Native American
Skeletal Remains, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 115, 135 (1990).
64. See Gene A. Marsh, Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native
American Remains and Sacred Items, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 79, 86-94 (1992); MEYER, supra note 15.
at 170-97.
65. See Roger Anyon, Protecting the Past, Protecting the Present: Cultural Resources and
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United States government needs to act quickly to adequately preserve Native
American cultural heritage before it is lost forever.
Subpart A considers the motivations of individual participants: the
pothunter, the collector, the curator, the archaeologist, the Native American.
Subpart B addresses the federal government's traditional theoretical position.
Subpart C broadly explores the major theoretical positions of other
international governments. And lastly, subpart D offers future suggestions that
consider the different perspectives of all the interested parties.
A. Individual Participants' Motivations
In 1793 Thomas Jefferson excavated the property surrounding Monticello,
his private residence in Virginia, to discover the origins of mound sites on his
property. For these excavation efforts, Jefferson was named the "father of
American archaeology."' He espoused a model plan for archaeology based
on pursuing a strategy, testing hypotheses, and publishing results. However,
the "father of American archaeology" neglected conservation in his model
plan 67
Many individuals involved with archaeology since Jefferson have also
neglected conservation concerns, and as a result, America's archaeological
sites are a quickly diminishing resource.' One explanation for this is that the
American public in general is not concerned with conservation of cultural
property. Collecting artifacts is associated with wealth, culture, prestige, and
status.' "[M]uch of the public . . . condones the looting of archaeological
sites . . . . both as a means of supplementing personal income and as a
personal hobby."" Many looters believe they have a right to collect artifacts,
and the activity is a favorite family pastime.7'
Ame.rican Indians, in PROTECTING THE PAST, supra note 32, at 215. "[A]dequate protection will
require a comprehensive integration of multiple cultural viewpoints about the importance of
cultural resources . i..." Id.
66. Edward Friedman, Antecedents to Cultural Resource Management, in PROTECTING THE
PAs1I, supra note 32, at 27, 27 (citing THOMAS F. KING Er AL., ANTHROPOLOGY IN HISTORIC
PRESERVATION: CARING FOR CULTURE'S CLUTTER 12 (1977) and GORDON R. WILLEY & JEREMY
A. SABLOFF, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY 138 (1973)).
67. Id.
68. See William D. Lipe, A Conservation Model for American Archaeology, in
CON' ERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDIES 19
(Michael B. Schiffer & George J. Gumerman, eds., 1977).
69. Thomas F. King, Some Dimensions of the Pothunting Problem, in PROTECTING THE
PASI, supra note 32, at 83, 88.
70. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS: CULTURAL
RESOURCES: PROBLEMS PROTECTING AND PRESERVING FEDERAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES
61 (lec. 1987) (GAO/RCED-88-3).
71. Id. at 27. One ranger with the Bureau of Land Management confessed that he used to
dig for antiquities before becoming a ranger. "It was an accepted fact of life.., to go out on a
Sunday afternoon with your family and dig for antiquities." Norm Brewer, Black Market in
Artifacts Thrives, IDAHO STATESMAN (Boise, Idaho), July 13, 1986, at IA. Another admitted
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1. The Pothunter
The financial incentive is the primary motivation for the pothunter to dig
for artifacts?2 Native American artifacts demand high prices in both
legitimate and black markets: a single earthenware jar may be in the range of
$10,000 or more.' Obviously, there is great potential for personal financial
gain. Furthermore, there is a direct correlation between the amount of
pothunting and the general economy of the locale; for example, rising
unemployment in the Southwest has resulted in increased pothunting.' In
some remote areas there is no sufficient source of income other than selling
archaeological resources.2 And, in more populated areas, even greater
amounts of destruction occur due to the increased number of participants
searching for the same limited supply of resources.'
While economic necessity may offer some justification for destruction of
archaeological sites, these problems are not solved in wealthier communities:
"wealth generates the development that menaces everything hidden in the
soil." So, the economic incentives are not easily cured. It is unlikely that
the pecuniary value of these artifacts will decrease such that they will no
longer be profitable to market. Furthermore, it is just as unlikely that local
development projects will be curtailed merely to preserve artifacts.
2. The Collector
Like the pothunter, the collector is driven partly by the prospects of
financial gain, and also by the desire to possess beautiful, exotic objects.
Additionally, many collectors believe they are saving objects from
obscurity." Experts have concluded that the underlying motivations are "the
need for possession, the need for spontaneous activity, the impulse to
self-advancement, and the tendency to classify things," and "the love of
beauty."79
pothunter who dug with his family for recreation explained, "[wle never figured anything was
wrong.... We figured the federal land was our land." Id. at 5A.
72. For a more detailed explanation of pothunters and their network, see Early, supra note
29. For a good discussion of the effects of looting in Arkansas, see Harrington, Looting, supra
note 29.
73. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 120. See generally Sid Kane, The Big - And Illegal -
Business of Indian Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1986, § 3, at 13. Not all artifacts, however, are
this valuable. Many bowls sell for less than ten dollars. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTNG OFcE, supra
note 70, at 28-29.
74. KING ET AL., supra note 66, at 86-87.
75. Id.
76. Northey, supra note 10, at 69.
77. MEYER, supra note 15, at 197.
78. Early, supra note 29, at 44. Lord Elgin, who as British ambassador excavated the
Acropolis and removed the Elgin Marbles to England, represents the archetypal collector; he "saw
himself as a savior of antiquity while at the same time having an eye to future market values."
MEYER, supra note 15, at 170-75, 179.
79. MEYER, supra note 15, at 188 (describing reports from two French analysts, Dr. Henri
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Unfortunately, collectors' desire for possession directly conflicts with
Native Americans' need to maintain control over their heritage. Furthermore,
collectors' criteria for collecting is often merely personal taste rather than
scholarly, cultural, or religious value. Collectors primarily value an object's
artistic beauty, rather than its potential for scientific information (gleaned from
the objects' archaeological context) or cultural significance."
3. The Curator
The motivations of the collector are closely related to the motivations of
the museum curator. Both are "friends of the past," and both desire
acquisition of beautiful objects. Frequently, however, the curator is a
frustrated collector who lacks the personal finances to satisfy his desire to
collect; so, instead, the museum curator collects on behalf of the public.
Thus, he has the additional justification of serving the public and the
advancement of art.' Curators believe that they have a responsibility to
preserve and exhibit artifacts to educate and benefit the public."
Additionally, museums contribute to the general economy by promoting
tourism."
While museums indeed provide an important public service, they are often
ideologically in conflict with both archaeologists and Native Americans. Like
collctors, museums desire possession of artifacts, but this conflicts with the
Native Americans' need to possess the objects they created for cultural and
religious purposes. Furthermore, one expert, both a museum director and an
archaeologist, explained:
An object of scientific interest should not be considered primarily
as an art work. Yet museums, which are supposed to educate the
public, often contribute to the idea that such and such a culture is
represented only by uniquely beautiful objects.... In fact, the
picture the public builds of ancient cultures can be permanently
distorted when the past is consistently presented as a kaleidoscope
of masterpieces.'
Codet in 1921 and Rene Brimo in 1938, respectively).
80. Id. at 187, 189-90.
81. lI at 191-92.
82. Bowen Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums - A Battle
for Artifacts, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 125, 128 (1979).
83. MEYER, supra note 15, at 196.
84. Id. at 195 (quoting a speech by Hugues de Varine-Bohan, director of the International
Council of Museums). However, the museum community believes it performs an important public
seLvice. The president of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, William B. Macomber, commented,
"Vie [the international museum community] are not the enemy; we are every bit as important in
preserving cultural patrimony as the great zoos of the world are in protecting and preserving
endangered species." Glueck, supra note 31, at C13.
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Thus, while museums preserve artifacts and educate the public, they also
contribute to public misconceptions about cultural property. The public needs
to understand the broader significance of cultural property in its archaeological
context, not just appreciate the beauty of great works of art. Without such an
understanding, museums merely fuel the market demand for exotic objects,
and the destruction of archaeological sites will inevitably continue.
4. The Archaeologist
Archaeologists' participate in the quest for artifacts to obtain information
and knowledge. They desire a greater understanding of the past and its
relationship to the present. Archaeologists study all aspects of archaeological
resources: the objects, their sites, the relationship between objects and sites,
and the environment. Through this study and analysis, archaeologists are often
able to reconstruct how people lived in history.' Archaeologists are
"interested in the story that the remains and artifacts can tell."'
In general, archaeologists have encouraged preservation of Native
American culture.' However, archaeologists, like collectors and museums,
also desire possession or access to remains and artifacts so that they may
continue to learn from objects as scientific techniques advance. This desire
directly conflicts with Native Americans' goals for repatriation and reburial."
Nevertheless, archaeologists' involvement is scientifically important, and
society benefits from their research and study. "To say that this knowledge
would be insignificant is to say that human behavior is a worthless subject for
study." Archaeologists' search for information and knowledge should be
encouraged, but it should also be compatible with other important, competing
interests of Native Americans and museums 9
5. The Native American
The final and most important individual participant is the Native American.
The objects in question are the human remains of their ancestors and artifacts
they created for cultural and religious purposes. In order for the objects to
85. Fifteen years ago an anthropology professor anticipated the current crisis situation for
archaeological resources and sites. He advised archaeologists to focus on resource conservation
and assume responsibility over all resources in order to decrease the rate of loss. See Lipe, supra
note 68.
86. Northey, supra note 10, at 62-65.
87. Marsh, supra note 64, at 87.
88. Peterson, supra note 63, at 122.
89. See Geoffrey Cowley, The Plunder of the Past, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1989, at 58.
90. MEYER, supra note 15, at 209 (in reference to the study of classic Mayan civilization).
91. See Cowley, supra note 89, at 58. In addition to being culturally significant to Native
Americans, archaeological resources and sites are important to environmental studies because
there is a correlation between sites and certain particularized environmental data. Lipe, supra note
68, at 28.
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serve their intended purposes, they must remain in their original or intended
sites.' In almost all circumstances, excavation and display of Native
American cultural property is contrary and offensive to their communal and
religious uses of the land and the objects." According to the chairman of the
Shoshone-Paiute Tribe, "Native Americans have always been repulsed by the
raiding of their ancestors' resting grounds."' Native Americans believe "that
the disturbance of the dead or of religious objects, alters, destroys, or
desecrates some relationship with the spirit world. Therefore, the dead should
not be disturbed even if knowledge of the past could be gained thereby."9
Cultural resources represent the heritage, cultural identity, religion, and
history of Native Americans, as peoples and as sovereign tribes, and
preservation of these resources is essential to the future existence of all Native
American culture.' It is important to emphasize that Native Americans are
bolh individuals and sovereign nations' - and it is as both individuals and
as sovereigns that Native Americans require possession and preservation of
their cultural property." Native Americans do not merely desire possession
of their cultural property, as the other participants do, they need possession
to preserve their race, nationality, and way of life. And, as admitted in U.S.
House and Senate reports, "America does not need to violate the religions of
her native peoples .... There is room for and great value in cultural and
religious diversity. . . . We would be the poorer if these American Indian
religions disappeared from the face of the Earth."'
92. Anyon, supra note 65, at 216.
93. Northey, supra note 10, at 65 & n.26; Peterson, supra note 63, at 120.
94. Sam Quinones, Vandals, Thieves Continue to Defile Indian Gravesites, IDAHO
STATESMAN, July 13, 1986, at IA, 4A (quoting Whitney MeKinney, chairman of the Shoshone-
Painte Tribe).
95. Peterson, supra note 63, at 120 (quoting C. Dean Higginbotham, Native Americans
Versus Archaeologists: The Legal Issues, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 91, 92 (1982)).
96. Anyon, supra note 65, at 221.
97. For a discussion of tribal sovereignty, see INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS
(19188) [hereinafter INDIAN TRIBES]. For a discussion of Hawaiian sovereignty, see Charles F.
Wilkinson, The Idea of Sovereignty: Native Peoples, Their Lands, and Their Dreams, 13 NARF
LEGAL REV. (Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Fall 1988, at I (vol. 13, no 4).
98. Native Americans may regulate inheritanee and their internal and social relations. Walter
R. I3choHawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing Competing Legal
Interests in Native Cultural Resources, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 437, 443 (1986).
Regulation of cultural property seems to fall clearly within these powers.
Walter EchoHawk, Senior Staff Attorney with the Native American Rights Fund in Boulder,
Colorado, believes religion is the most crucial issue for Native Americans today. Maggie Rivas,
"On the Side of Hope"; Indians Endeavor to Save Tribal Identities, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 11, 1992, at IA. Preservation of Native American cultural property is essential to the future
of Native American religion because their culture and religion are inseparable.
Recently, Native Americans have actively called for recog nition of their status as sovereign
nations; they have also specifically emphasized their "right to preserve their cultural identities."
Michael S. Serrill, Struggling to be Themselves, TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 52.
99. H.R. REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978); S. REP. No. 709, 95th Cong., 2d
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The motivations of each participant, the pothunter, the collector, the
curator, the archaeologist, and the Native American, offer some justification
for their respective behaviors to further their differing interests at the expense
of other participants. Unfortunately, each participant (except, ironically, the
Native American, whose cultural heritage is at stake) views the past as
property," and each participant (including the Native American) desires
possession of or control over this past property. While Native Americans
clearly have the most urgent and persuasive claims to possession of their
cultural resources, archaeologists and museums also have significant claims
that deserve some recognition.'' A hierarchy of interests seems obvious:
Native Americans first and foremost, archaeologists second, public art
institutions and museums third, private collectors fourth, and pothunters
nowhere." However, adequate national protection for Native American
cultural property should consider the valid and differing viewpoints of each
participant in an integrated solution to the problem.t °
B. The Federal Government's Traditional Theory
The United States' traditional perspective on cultural property preservation
and protection has been a laissez-faire policy because the problem involves
trade relations and import and export regulations."° This policy, which
promotes free trade of art, has at least been applied consistently: in most
circumstances American laws do not significantly restrict import or export of
cultural property." The United States is one of the only countries that has
failed to regulate cultural property because historically we have been the
major art importing nation." Some authorities approximate that ninety
percent of the foreign artifacts sold in America are stolen or illegally exported
goods. As a result, the United States has been critically described as the
"dumping ground" for stolen art." There is, however, a direct correlation
between international art trade and archaeological site destruction. Looters are
Sess. 3 (1978), quoted in Vine Deloria, Jr., Sacred Lands and Religious Freedom, NARF LEGAL
REV. (Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Summer 1991, at 1 (vol. 16, no. 2).
100. MEYER, supra note 15, at 203.
101. Anyon, supra note 65, at 221.
102. The author, even with an interest and background in art history, cannot deny that the
interests of Native Americans and archaeologists must come before the art community and private
citizens.
103. Anyon, supra note 65, at 215.
104. Jore, supra note 5, at 80.
105. SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF MOVABLE
CULTURAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 130 (1978).
106. BATOR, supra note 50, at 38.
107. Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 18-19.
108. Lee Ann Houseman, Comment, Current Practices and Problems in Combatting
Illegality in the Art Market, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 506, 540 (1982).
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motivated by the high prices paid for artifacts in the international market."
As a result, when America promotes (or fails to restrict) the art market, it
effictively encourages looting of archaeological resources both abroad and at
home."'
The United States supports its laissez-faire policy by two arguments: first,
government restrictions on alienation of personal property are adverse to a
free enterprise system; and second, strict restrictions on art export only
increase the price of art on the black market and encourage continued illegal
activity."' Additionally, scholars and the art community justify promoting
free trade by arguing that cultural property belongs to and enriches all
mankind, not just those nations controlling land rich in archaeological
resources. This is a popular theory espoused by most art importing
nations." '2 Other justifications emphasize that international free trade in art
opens communication between nations, encourages artistic creativity, and
increases opportunities to understand different cultures.
The United States has continued its general support for the laissez-faire
policy because it viewed itself as an art importing nation. We have ignored
our rich supply of Native American artifacts and have profited from free trade
in art at the risk of losing a valuable cultural heritage."' As we begin to
recognize the necessity of immediate protection and preservation of our
cultural property, we are coincidentally gradually abandoning our prior
theoretical arguments and changing to a perspective similar to that espoused
by major art resource countries, as discussed in subpart C.
America's changing perspective is apparent in the enactment of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA), in which the
government establishes a policy to protect and preserve Native Americans'
freedom of religion through access to religious sites, possession of sacred
objects, and freedom to ceremonial worship."4 AIRFA recognizes a
relationship between the object and its culture that deserves protection.
Furthermore, AIRFA implies that restrictions on the alienability of cultural
property that further the goal of Native American possession of sacred objects
should be promoted."'
109. BATOR, supra note 50, at 25.
110. See Houseman, supra note 108, at 542.
111. Id. at 540-41. The art community frequently argues that restrictions on free trade will
"only divert the trade to other countries, the market is not infinite in capacity." Howevcr,
"[e]liminating one segment will reduce the demand as a whole .... ." Ellen Herscher,
International Control Efforts: Are There Any Good Solutions?, in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note
29, at 117, 124.
112. Karen J. Warren, A Philosophical Perspective on the Ethics and Resolution of Cultural
Properties Issues, in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note 29, at 1, 5-6.
113. See James J. Fishman & Susan Metzger, Protecting America's Cultural and Historical
Patrimony, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT1L L. & COM. 57, 58-59 (1976).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
115. John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict inalienability, 74
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However, AIRFA does not go so far as to "create a cause of action or any
judicially enforceable individual rights" for Native Americans." ' Legislative
history indicates that AIRFA merely ensures that the government not burden
Native Americans' freedom of religion without first deciding that this right
must yield to a more important concern." 7  AIRFA indicates a new
perspective for American policy for religious protection, but is only an initial
step toward change. The government must do more to effectuate a substantive
change that will indeed protect and preserve Native American cultural
heritage."'
C. Other Nations' Theories
In general, foreign nations can be classified as either art importing nations,
like the United States, or art exporting nations, also referred to as art resource
nations. Without discussing the particulars of any individual country, it is
possible to summarize the major theoretical arguments espoused by most
countries in each of the two opposing categories."' The basic controversy
concerns who owns the past. In an extremely simplified analysis, most art
importing nations theorize that "everyone owns the past," the past is
"humanity's past," while most art resource nations theorize that the past is
owned by its representative group, usually the nation, which claims national
patrimony over artifacts."
1. Art Importing Nations' Arguments
One commentator, Professor Warren, classifies the theories espoused by art
importing nations into six major arguments. Each argument attempts to justify
unlimited trade in cultural resources and continued possession of imported
property.
First, the rescue argument: if importing countries failed to rescue cultural
resources from their countries of origin, these resources would be destroyed
CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1220-21 (1989); see also The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966,
16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (recent amendment requiring a study of antiquities
trafficking and consultation with Native Americans, thus implying the importance of protecting
Native American antiquities, i.e., cultural property, from illegal activities).
116. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,455 (1987). Even
Justice Brennan in the dissent agrees with this proposition. Id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 455; 124 CONG. REC. 21,444 (1978).
118. For a discussion of proposed amendments to AIRFA, see Kristen L. Boyles, Note,
Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117 (1991).
119. For information regarding individual nations and further analysis of general theories,
see Warren, supra note 112, at 1; BATOR, supra note 50, at 18-59. See generally Fishman &
Metzger, supra note 113, at 58; Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14.
120. Warren, supra note 112, at 2-3. Ms. Warren is a philosophy professor specializing in
ethics and social philosophy, environmental ethics, and feminism. The author relies on her article
heavily in this section.
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by the elements, pothunters, or war. The rescue mission forms the basis for
ownership rights to cultural property because of the values preserved, the
costs incurred, and the benefits gained.'
Second, the foreign ownership argument: cultural resources were removed
from their countries of origin legally; therefore, the importing nation has valid
ownership claims to them. The issue here is whose law controls ownership
and removal of the cultural property.' "
Third, the humanity ownership argument: cultural property has artistic,
intellectual, and educational value to all mankind; therefore, it cannot be
owned by any one nation but is the property of all humanity and everyone has
an equal claim to it."
Fourth, the means-ends argument: free trade in cultural property promotes
art appreciation, artistic creativity, education, scholarship, knowledge of
different cultures, and open communication between nations. Art serves as a
"good will ambassador" and benefits all countries in some utilitarian
manner. 124
121. Id. at 3-4 (noting that collectors and, ironically, some pothunters justify their activities
with this argument); Early, supra note 29, at 45.
122. Warren, supra note 112, at 4-5. This was the central issue in the dispute over
ownership of early Christian Byzantine Mosaics in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). Four mosaics were
stolen from the Greek-Orthodox Church in 1979 by Turkish vandals during civil war in Cyprus.
The Turkish Cypriots formed their own government and currently control northern Cyprus, while
the Greek Cypriots control southern Cyprus. The United States only recognizes the Greek Cypriot
government. Id. at 280-81.
The Church claimed ownership to the mosaics because a thief can only acquire possession
not title to stolen goods. When a thief passes the stolen goods to a bona fide purchaser (here, the
defendant, Goldberg), the purchaser also acquires only possession because the thief has no title
to pass to him. Id. at 290-91. However, the defendant argued that because the Turkish Cypriots
formed a government, and it was their military that removed the mosaics, the Turkish Cypriot
military did acquire title. Id. at 291-92. Nevertheless, the United States does not recognize this
Turkish Cypriot government, and the court refused to view this government as a de facto
government. Id. at 292-93. Therefore, the defendant was ordered to return the mosaics to the
Church, the rightful owner. Id. at 293-94. Thus, a prior independent decision by Congress not
to recognize the Turkish government in Cyprus determined that the removal of the mosaics from
the Church was "illegal" and that the Church still held title to the mosaics.
123. Warren, supra note 112, at 5-6. This theory was promoted by the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Merryman
& Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 12 (quoting the 1954 Convention as stating that "damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of
all mankind ... preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the
world"), and the 1972 Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Herscher, supra note 111, at 120 (quoting the 1972 Convention as stating that "deterioration or
disappearance of any item of the cultural or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment
of the heritage of all the nations of the world").
124. Warren, supra note 112, at 6-7; Houseman, supra note 108, at 541. This is a common
argument espoused by the United States and the art community. Cf BATOR, supra note 50, at
30-31 (arguing that "[a]rt as a good ambassador" is also a reason art resource countries may
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Fifth, the scholarly access argument: museum curators, educators, scholars,
and other authorized persons have a responsibility to preserve cultural
resources for the public, but in order to fulfill this duty they must have free
access to the resources.125
And sixth, the encouragement of illegal activity argument. restrictions on
free trade of art only encourage illegal activity; pothunting increases and the
black market flourishes. As a result, trade restrictions are unjustified because
they encourage the very illegal activity that should be discouraged. A related
argument is that free trade restrictions merely divert the trade to other
markets.'
Each of these arguments supports importing nations' claims to free trade
in cultural property and retention of imported property. However, each
argument opens a myriad of problems and may be countered by equally
persuasive arguments offered by art resource nations to promote restrictions
on alienation and repatriation of exported property.
2. Arguments for Art Resource Nations
Professor Warren explains three major arguments for cultural property
retention and export restrictions by art resource nations.
First, the cultural heritage argument: indigenous people and countries of
origin have a right to possess cultural property that is essential to their
heritage and identity and that symbolizes shared values, experiences, and
beliefs. A country's national patrimony includes property with unique historic,
religious, and cultural significance: this property educates a nation's citizens
about who they are and what they believe."n
Second, the country of origin ownership argument: cultural property is
owned by its country of origin. This is simply a claim to ownership of the
past based solely on the original location of the property." Ironically, under
this argument the descendants of colonizers may claim ownership to native
artifacts.'"
promote export to stimulate interest, understanding, and admiration in their country, resulting in
increased tourism and study of their art and culture).
125. Warren, supra note 112, at 7. This is another primary justification offered by the art
community.
126. Id. at 7-8; Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 16 (explaining that "the
absence of a licit market insures the existence of an illicit one, with the usual consequences: loss
of control over a traffic that, if licit, could be regulated").
127. Warren, supra note 112, at 8-9; BATOR, supra note 50, at 28; see also Merryman &
Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 8. One obvious and extreme American example is the Liberty
Bell. Id. While American cultural property is usually primarily cultural and historic, Native
American cultural property is almost always cultural, historic, and religious.
128. Warren, supra note 112, at 9.
129. Consider, for example, that in Latin America the descendants of Spanish conquistadors,
who destroyed the Maya, Aztec, and Inca empires, are claiming a superior right to the cultural
property of these very civilizations. Glueck, supra note 31, at C13.
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Third, the scholarly and aesthetic integrity argument: activities which
move cultural property decrease their scholarly value and aesthetic integrity.
A related argument emphasizes concern for the safety of cultural property
from potential damage or loss. For example, by separating related artifacts or
breaking apart monuments, valuable archaeological information and artistic
beauty are destroyed; thus, these activities are contrary to preservation
concerns.1
30
One additional argument for art resource nations, suggested by other
commentators, is the economic interest argument: if cultural property will not
bring a price on the open market equal to its full financial value, then it
should be retained by its country of origin to prevent economic loss. In
computing this value it is essential to consider all the benefits of ownership,
including the objecet's influence on tourism and its psychological and social
effects on society.'
Just as with the art importing arguments, the success of these art resource
arguments depends on the particular circumstances. A justification can be
found for almost any position; therefore, nations need to carefully balance the
competing interests and establish an integrated strategy to promote the most
important concerns.
3. Nonrenewable Resource Argument
A final theory, the non-renewable resource argument, falls outside the
importing nation/resource nation classification scheme; it focuses on
preservation rather than property rights. Cultural property is a non-renewable
environmental resource like endangered species; it cannot be replenished once
it is destroyed.' Furthermore, looting destroys much of the opportunity for
archaeological study from the site even if stolen objects are later recovered,
which is unlikely.3 Mankind should be the custodian over cultural property,
guarding and protecting it from potential extinction. No one nation or people
own the past, but all are collectively responsible for its protection and
preservation for future generations."3
130. Warren, supra note 112, at 9-11; see also Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14,
at 9-11 (supporting the return of the Elgin Marbles to the Parthenon).
131. Merryman,& Elsen, HotArt, supra note 14, at 10; BATOR, supra note 50, at 27 (further
explaining that "[ilf the price realized on export equals or exceeds the fair value of the work
(including its nonmonetary or social value), then the national wealth remains intact"). For an
in-depth discussion of market and trade considerations, see Moustakas, supra note 115, at 1179.
Moustakas argues persuasively that "the marketplace is a flawed device for the distribution and
disposition of some types of cultural property." Id. at 1183 n.12.
132. Warren, supra note 112, at 19; MEYER, supra note 15, at 203; WILLIAMS, supra note
105, at 108. For a discussion of the rights of future generations to cultural property, see
Moustakas, supra note 115, at 1205 n.107, 1208 n.114, 1212 nn.132-33, 1213 nn.134-36, 1214
nn. 137-38 and accompanying text.
133. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFicE, supra note 70, at 10; Lipe, supra note 68.
134. Warren, supra note 112, at 19.
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This preservation theory should be considered in relation to all other
potential justifications for government action or inaction regarding cultural
property. Dismissing preservation concerns may have drastic consequences for
future generations.'35 One commentator has predicted that "in our lifetime
we may see [cultural heritage] dwindle meaninglessly away, not so much
because anyone has willed it, but because not enough people are aware the
problem exists, as the destruction of American Indian sites all too clearly
suggests."'" Any successful solution to this problem will surely balance the
practical, theoretical, and ethical concerns of the interested parties with the
ultimate goal of preservation of cultural heritage.
D. Suggestions for the Future
For such a complex problem, it is impossible to prescribe any strategy that
will work unilaterally. Arguably, when approaching the problem of preserving
Native American cultural heritage, it will be difficult if not impossible to
formulate a solution that will benefit all of the interested parties;
consequently, we must decide which interests are most deserving of
recognition.
Of the individual participants - the pothunter, the collector, the curator,
the archaeologist, and the Native American - Native Americans, as
individuals and as sovereign nations, have the most valid claims to their
cultural heritage. Native American tribes represent the lineal descendants of
these cultural objects. The items in question are the human remains of their
ancestors and religious and cultural objects made by their hands. Furthermore,
possession of these objects is essential to the continued existence of Native
American culture.3 (This reasoning follows the cultural heritage argument
espoused by art resource countries.'38) Archaeologists and museum curators
also have secondary, valid claims to possession of Native American cultural
135. But see Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 18 (suggesting that art resource
nations with an abundance of archaeological resources and a poor economy should "mine" these
resources to the international art market as a source of income).
136. MEYER, supra note 15, at 203-04. Another commentator vividly describes the potential
future:
If we leave an environment to [future generations] that is fit for pigs they will
be like pigs; their tastes will adapt to their conditions.... Suppose we destroyed
all of our literary, artistic, and musical heritage; suppose we left to future
generations only potboiler romances, fluorescent velvet paintings, and disco songs.
We would then surely ensure a race of uncultured near-illiterates.
Mark Sagoff, We Have Met he Enemy and He is Us or Conflict and Contradiction in
Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283, 300 (1982), quoted in Moustakas, supra note 115, at
1217.
137. See Sum, supra note 19, at Al.
138. Native Americans could base their claims on any of the art resource or non-renewable
resource arguments since all persuasively apply to their perspective. See supra notes 127-31 and
accompanying text.
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heritage since they educate and enrich the public with these objects. (They
would most likely base their claims on the scholarly access argument.')
Reconciling these competing interests is not easy, however, because Native
Americans need near-exclusive control over their heritage to preserve their
culture, religion, and way of life for future generations of Native Americans.
Human remains should be reburied, and cultural objects should remain in their
environmental context and be used for the religious and cultural purposes for
which they were created.'" Ultimately, decisions regarding cultural property
must rest with the respective Native American tribe, which has the right of
self-government over its people, including specific rights to regulate
inheritance and internal and social relations.'
Perhaps a careful limitation on what items are considered "cultural
property" would offer a compromise for the competing interests: Native
Americans could retain control over "essential" cultural objects,' according
to their definition of essential, while museums and archaeologists retain
duplicate or less important objects.'43 Additionally, some type of
time-sharing arrangement could be possible between the parties for certain
objects over which Native Americans do not need exclusive, continued
control.'" Or, Native Americans could loan certain objects to museums for
limited time periods for a fee, like other nations loan art and artifacts for
special exhibitions.
]Kn balancing the competing (and unequal) interests, commentators do not
agree on a model solution, but there are clearly unsuccessful strategies that
should be avoided. First and foremost, total export bans have proven
unsuccessful for Western nations.4  Additionally, selective export
prohibitions are usually unsuccessful. Practically, it is impossible to enforce
such embargoes; the export prohibitions merely shift trade to the black market
139. Again, there are other arguments that could apply, for example, the human ownership
or means-ends arguments. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
This article has suggested a hierarchy of interests: first Native Americans, second
archaeologists, third public museums, fourth private citizens. See supra note 102 and
acccmpanying text.
140. See Suro, supra note 19, at Al; Nichols, supra note 41, at 35.
141. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 443-44; INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 97, at 35-36; Serrill,
supra note 98, at 52. See supra note 2.
142. Cf. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (Supp.
11 1990) (defining cultural items as associated funerary objects, unassociated funerary objects,
sacred objects, or cultural patrimony).
143. Andre Emmerich, a New York dealer in pre-Columbian art commented, "most early
tombs [contain] -the equivalents of today's Coca-Cola bottles and 7Up cans, as well as assembly
line devotional objects." Glueck, supra note 31, at C13. Undoubtedly, this comment is somewhat
true; however, it is important that Native Americans define their own cultural property so that a
supposed expert does not mislabel a necessary object, for example, a knotting string.
144. BATOR, supra note 50, at 89-90. See supra note 2.
145. Herscher, supra note 111, at 122.
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and encourage illegal activity. The supply of desired objects is limited,
thereby increasing their value and in turn providing further incentive for
pothunters and commercial traffickers to engage in illegal activity."4
Most commentators agree that some form of licit market is necessary to
avoid the undesirable consequences of an increased black market. (The Indian
Arts and Crafts Act, discussed in part IV, could play an important role
here.47) The problems surrounding the creation of an adequate licit market
involve how to define and control the licit market while still providing
adequate protection to endangered cultural property.'" Commentators agree
that it is unrealistic to expect wealthy art importing nations to cooperate with
art resource nations to enforce restrictive strategies that do not in some
manner permit trade in art.14 Yet, an international cooperative effort is
essential for the success of any strategy."'
Somehow the federal government must reconcile the interests of competing
and unequal parties and find a satisfactory, integrated solution to the problem
of preservation and protection of Native American cultural heritage. The loss
of such a culture would have lasting effects on both present and future
generations of Native Americans and all other Americans.
[O]ne can manifestly contend that if the remains of the past
should disappear, our lives will be poorer in ways that the
statistician can never measure - we will live in a drabber world,
and will have squandered a resource that enlivens our existence,
offers a key to our nature, and, not least, acts as a psychic ballast
as we venture into a scary future.'5 '
With this background in the motivations, incentives, theories, and potential
consequences for all interested parties, this article will now analyze the
specific protections currently provided by American laws.
IV. The Law
There are no laws in the United States that expressly prohibit export of
cultural property." However, two recent laws expressly prohibit trafficking,
and thus effectively regulate the export of cultural resources that fall within
their scope." Historically, the United States has viewed itself as a major
146. Id. at 122.
147. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (1988). See infra notes 308-22 and accompanying text.
148. Herscher, supra note 111, at 125. See supra note 2.
149. Houseman, supra note 108, at 565.
150. Id. at 565-67. For an analysis of specific foreign export restrictions and suggested
strategies, see BATOR, supra note 50, at 34-51.
151. MEYER, supra note 15, at 208-09.
152. Karen D. Vitelli, Issues in Archeology: The ABCs of lte Antiquities Market, EARLY
MAN MAG., Spring 1982, at 29, 31.
153. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (1988); Native
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art-importing nation, not as an art resource nation; consequently, export laws
have been considered an unnecessary hindrance to international trade.
Unfortunately, this viewpoint fails to recognize the precious, yet unprotected,
Naive American cultural resources that have been lost and destroyed while
the government fails to effectively act on their behalf, choosing instead to
protect an open market and free trade. Finally, the law is beginning to change
as American society and federal and state governments respond to the pleas
of Native Americans to protect these invaluable objects of cultural, historic,
religious, artistic, and scientific significance."
While regulating trafficking is important to cultural property preservation,
it i; also important to regulate export in general. Cultural property leaves the
United States not only by illicit theft and trafficking, but also by licit auctions
and private sales. Laws limiting trafficking address one avenue for loss but
leave other avenues open for continued future loss. Since there are no express
export laws, it is necessary to consider the whole body of cultural property
law, which includes various related statutes, to understand exactly which items
are protected under which circumstances. "In general, this area of law
represents a response to activities perceived, to be threatening or endangering
the nation's cultural heritage."S Subsequent laws and amendments have
resulted from changing perceptions, gradually expanding the law to offer more
and more protection." Still, more protection is needed, especially to save
Native American cultural heritage.
Subpart A discusses background cultural property laws and highlights the
gaps and problems of these laws in protecting Native American cultural
property. Subpart B summarizes the current laws that are used to prosecute
illegal activities concerning cultural property, specifically as they are applied
to protect Native American resources, with special emphasis on the trafficking
provisions and how these provisions may be applied to regulate export also.
A. Background Cultural Property Law
L Antiquities Act
Congress has acknowledged the importance of preserving cultural property
for most of the twentieth century. However, until recently, the laws Congress
enacted to promote this preservation have been largely ineffective, especially
for preserving Native American cultural property.'" The first such
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. If 1990).
154. See Larry Witham, Jndians' Political Muscle Flexed Over Past 20 Years, WASH. TIMEs.
July 23, 1991, at AS.
155. Peterson, supra note 63, at 135.
156. Id.
157. For a discussion of laws protecting Native American religious and cultural interests, see
Peterson, supra note 63 (regarding human remains and funerary objects); Platzman, supra note
53 (Legarding repatriation). See generally Dean B. Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom
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preservation law, the Antiquities Act, was enacted in 1906.5 It provides for
the prosecution of any person "who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or
destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of
antiquity" situated on United States government lands without permission
from the appropriate governmental authority."9 While the Antiquities Act
provides for preservation of "objects of antiquity" in general, it fails to
specifically provide for Native American rights to own and dispose of their
own artifacts."w Instead, excavations are permissible only if they benefit
museums or educational institutions. 6' Furthermore, since the Antiquities
Act fails to mention sale, purchase, transfer, or transport of artifacts, it is
impossible to use the Antiquities Act to prosecute unwanted export of objects.
Protection under the Antiquities Act is limited to destruction or removal of
antiquities located on federal lands."
It was not until 1974 that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit tested
the effectiveness of the criminal provisions of the Antiquities Act in United
States v. Diaz." Unfortunately, the Diaz court declared the Antiquities Act
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to define important terms such as
"ruin" and "object of antiquity"; consequently, it provided insufficient notice
to potential offenders.'" If the court had restricted its holding to the specific
and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 1 (1982). See supra note 2.
158. Ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)). For a more detailed analysis of the Antiquities Act and its historical foundations, see
Kristine Olson Rogers, Visigoths Revisited: The Prosecution ofArchaeological Resource Thieves,
Traffickers, and Vandals, 2 ENVTL. L. & LIG. 47 (1987). Regarding protection of Native
American artifacts, see Blair, supra note 82, at 133-38.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 431 of the Antiquities Act authorizes
the President to declare as national monuments certain historic landmarks located on federally
owned or controlled land, and section 432 provides for permits to be granted to properly qualified
institutions for "examination of ruins," "excavation of archaeological sites," and "gathering of
objects of antiquity," provided these permitted activities benefit museums or scientific or
educational institutions. Id. §§ 431-432.
160. The Antiquities Act has also been criticized by leading proponents for Native American
rights because it includes Native American human remains in the category of protected
archaeological resources, rather than protecting these remains according to common law principles
applied to other human remains; in effect, this law fails to recognize deceased Native American
ancestors as human beings. Jack F. Trope & Walter R. EchoHawk, The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35,
42-43 (1992).
161. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 449.
162. See 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
163. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). Defendant was charged with a violation of § 433 of the
Antiquities Act for appropriating masks three or four years old from a cave on an Apache Indian
Reservation. The masks were considered sacred objects and were used by the Apaches in
religious ceremonies. Id. at 114.
164. Id. at 114-15. Specifically, the statute did not define the age of an item that constituted
an "object of antiquity," nor did it define prohibited uses of the object; as a result, a person of
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
facts of the case (which involved objects only four years old), perhaps the
Antiquities Act could have been effectively applied in other prosecutions in
which the status of the object as an antiquity was not under debate.'"
Technically, the Antiquities Act is only unconstitutional in the Ninth Circuit;
however, since most of the artifacts requiring protection are located on lands
in this circuit, the ruling is significant.'" Consequently, most subsequent
attempts to protect Native American objects have not been prosecuted under
the Antiquities Act, but under the statutes discussed in subpart B.'67
2'. National Historic Preservation Act
Chronologically, the next important statute offering protection to cultural
property is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), as
amended.'6 NHPA specifically declares that "the historical and cultural
common intelligence could not be held responsible for knowing that masks four years old were
coveed by statute. lit
165. See Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 63; see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 449 F.
Supp. 42 (D. Ariz. 1978). The Jones case involved the theft of various Indian artifacts from
Indian ruins in the Tonto National Forest. The defendant was charged with theft and malicious
mischief violations because the Antiquities Act had been found unconstitutionally vague in Dlaz,
but then the court dismissed these charges holding that the defendant should have been prosecuted
under the Act because his acts were within those intended to be exclusively prosecuted under the
Antiquities Act. Id. at 45-46. This ruling left artifacts in the Ninth Circuit wholly without
protection, and on appeal the ruling was reversed. One week later ARPA was enacted. A new
trial date was set, but the defendants opted in favor of a plea bargain under ARPA. In the end,
each defendant served no more than one year in prison and paid a $1000 fine. Rogers, Visigoths,
supra note 158, at 66-68.
166. H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A,N.
1709, 1727 (letter from Patricia M. Wald, assistant attorney general). The Antiquities Act has
been upheld in the Tenth Circuit. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979)
(upholding the Antiquities Act because the objects in question were 800 to 900 years old, and
a person of ordinary intelligence would know that such objects are included in the term
"antiquity"). The Symer court also stated that "vagueness must be considered in reference to the
specific conduct charged against the defendant. Id. at 941.
167. Furthermore, penalties under the Antiquities Act are insufficient - a fine of not more
than $5000, or six months imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)(6), 3581(b)(7) (1988).
Considering a pothunter may receive $5000 for just one pot, these penalties do not offer sufficient
deterrence. See Northey, supra note 10, at 71; Sherry Hutt, Illegal Trafficking in Native American
Human Remains and Cultural Items: A New Protection Tool, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 140 (1992).
168. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For a detailed analysis of
NHPA, its application to Indian lands, and protection of artifacts, see H. Barry Holt,
Archaeological Preservation on Indians Lands: Conflicts and Dilemmas in Applying the National
Historic Preservation Act, 15 ENvTL. L. 413 (1985). For a general in-depth analysis of NHPA,
see John M. Fowler, Federal Historic Preservation Laii: National Historic Preservation Act,
Executive Order 11593, and Other Recent Developments in Federal Law, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 31 (1976). For discussion of related statutes, including the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960
(16 U.S.C. §§ 469 to 469c-1 (1988)), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1988)), and the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C.
§§ 469 to 469c-2 (1988)), see Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 58-61; H. MARCUS PRICE I11,
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foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our
community life."'" NHPA establishes a comprehensive preservation scheme
directed toward protecting sites, structures, and objects of historic,
archaeological, and cultural significance that would qualify for inclusion in the
National Register of Historic Places; m that is, sites and structures that
"possess integrity of location, design, setting .... [and] workmanship," and
that are associated with events or persons significant to our history, or that
may yield important historic or prehistoric information.'
Certainly, Native Americans may have qualifying burial and ceremonial
sites declared historic places in accordance with NHPA, and thereby gain
greater federal protection for these sites. However, NHPA only offers
protection against damage from undertakings by the federal government,"
not against thievery by pothunters." Because NHPA, like the Antiquities
Act, does not cover the sale, purchase, transfer, or transport of artifacts, it
cannot be used to prevent unwanted export and effective loss of invaluable
cultural property.'74 However, NHPA is significant in that it is the first
preservation law to require Native Americans to participate in the
decision-making process for protection of their artifacts as historic objects. 7
DISPUrING THE DEAD: U.S. LAW ON ABORIGINAL REMAINS AND GRAVE GOODS 26-29 (1991).
See supra note 2.
169. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (1988).
170. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
171. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4(a) (1993).
172. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1988); Peterson, supra note 63, at 141.
173. Recent amendments to NHPA, signed by President George Bush on October 30, 1992,
will provide valuable information regarding illegal trafficking in antiquities. Section 4015 of the
amendments, titled "Interstate and International Traffic in Antiquities," authorizes the
appropriation of "not more that $500,000" for study and report on "the suitability and feasibility
of alternatives for controlling illegal interstate and international traffic in antiquities." National
Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 4015, 106 Stat. 4753,
4762-63 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470h-5 (Supp. IV 1992)). In conjunction with this study, the
Secretary is instructed to consult with federal agencies responsible for antiquities, state
preservation officers, related state and international organizations, Indian tribes, and other
interested persons. Thus, the study should provide Congress with a comprehensive analysis of
illegal trafficking in Native American cultural property, both interstate and internationally, and
possible solutions as suggested by all interested parties. Id.
This amendment is the result of a two-year battle led by Sen. Wyche Fowler (D.-Ga.) to
attempt to establish a national registry of antiquities. Telephone Interview with David Brooks,
Staff Member of the Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests of the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Nov. 11, 1992). Although it is unlikely that such
a registry will be created because of the practical difficulties and differing political opinions, if
it were, it would be an essential resource to effective enforcement of theft laws and possible
export regulations for art and antiquities.
174. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
175. 16 U.S.C. § 470-1 (1988). ARPA requires notification to relevant Native American
tribes in its permitting procedure, and NAGPRA requires consultation with or consent from
Native American tribes in its permitting procedure. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (1988); 25 U.S.C. §
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Native Americans need to be involved in the decision-making process so that
our laws identify and adequately protect the cultural objects Native Americans
consider essential to their heritage.
3. UNESCO Convention and Cultural Property Implementation Act
In 1970, the United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) held a conference which forms the legal foundation for modern
international legislation governing the import and export of cultural property,
namely the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
(Convention).'76 Throughout the Convention, cultural property is broadly
defined as property "specifically designated by each State as being of
importance for archeology, prehistory, literature, art or science and which
belongs to" one of a list of eleven categories."
Briefly,76 the major substantive provisions of the Convention provide for
all signing nations to act to prevent their institutions from acquiring illegally
exported cultural property (art. 7(a)), to recover and return imported, stolen
cultural property (art. 7(b)), and to participate in multilateral action in crisis
situations to prevent injury to cultural heritage of other signing nations (art.
9).7 Other provisions in the Convention include commitments to oppose
practices that encourage impoverishment of cultural heritage (art. 2), establish
national protective services for cultural heritage (art. 5), prohibit export of
cultural property without export certificates (art. 6), and restrict illegal
3002(c) (Supp. I 1990). See infra notes 214-17, 286 and accompanying text. When NHPA,
ARPA, or NAGPRA requires federal agencies to cooperate or participate with Native Americans,
it is important to remember that Native American tribes are sovereign nations; therefore, agencies
should treat Native American tribes as foreign governments, not merely as individual citizens.
See ailso NHPA Amendments of 1992, 16 U.S.C. § 470-1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (declaring,
as a policy of the federal government, to cooperate with Indian tribes and assist Indian tribes to
expand their historic preservation programs and activities); id. § 470a(d) (establishing a new
progrm to assist Indian tribes preserve their historic properties); id. § 470a(j) (establishing a
comprehensive preservation education and training program that requires consultation with tribal
organizations); id. § 470h-2(a) (requiring each federal agency to consult with Indian tribes and
the private sector when carrying out historic preservation planning activities); id. § 470h-4(b)
(requiring the Secretary to encourage protection of Native American cultural items); id. § 470i
(requiring one member of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to represent Indian
tribes,).
176. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 7.
177. ld. at art. 1.
178. This is a brief, skeletal summary of the Convention; for more detailed analyses,
commentaries, and related materials, see MEYER, supra note 15, at app. F; WILLIAMS, supra note
105, at 170-200 (chapter 5, "Protection of Cultural Property Rendered by International
Agre-ments and Recommendations"); BATOR, supra note 50, at app., Herein of the UNESCO
Convention; Jore, supra note 5.
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movement of cultural property through education and information (art. 10)."
In addition to these specific provisions, any "import, export or transfer of
ownership of cultural property effected contrary to ... [the] Convention" is
expressly declared "illicit......
While the United States Senate ratified the Convention in 1972, subject to
one "reservation" and six "understandings" which clarify certain problematic
provisions to make them consistent with American law and ideology," the
Convention did not take legal effect in the United States until 1983 when
Congress enacted the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
(CPIA). " CPIA primarily implements articles 7(b) and 9 of the Convention,
which provide for recovery and return of stolen, imported cultural property
and assistance in crisis situations to prevent irreparable harm to cultural
heritage of other signing nations. However, CPIA differs from the Convention
in that export provisions are limited, if not arguably lacking: in CPIA the
United States retains the right to unilaterally decide when and if to impose
export controls on American cultural property. Additionally, CPIA must be
compatible with existing national laws and remedies" 4 (which do not
regulate the export of cultural property unless it is also stolen property),
including the National Stolen Property Act discussed in subpart B. In
summary, CPIA prohibits import of illegally exported and stolen artifacts in
certain circumstances and is devoted to curtailing the pillage of archaeological
sites in other countries.' Unfortunately, CPIA does not extend this same
180. UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 2, 5-6, 10; BATOR, supra note 50, at
101-02.
181. UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, at art. 3.
182. 1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, VISUAL ARTS, supra note 15, at 95-96 cmts. 1-3.
183. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988). For a discussion on CPIA and its problems, see Leah
A. Hofkin, The Cultural Properly Act: The Art of Compromre, 12 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
423 (1988); ADVISORY COMMITrEE, supra note 37, at 4. The impact of CPIA for protection of
American cultural property is greatly limited because other major art-importing nations (including
France, Japan, Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom) have failed to sign the
Convention. Moustakas, supra note 115, at 1181-82 n.5. Canada is the only other major
art-importing nation to sign the Convention, but interestingly, Canada, like the United States, has
cultural property from North American Indians to protect from illegal trade and export. See John
Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INTL L. 831, 832
nA, 843. For a discussion of Canada's legislation implementing the Convention and effecting
import and export of cultural property, see Aaron Milrad, The Cultural Property Export and
Import Act, 19 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 15 (1989).
184. Barbara B. Rosecrance, Note, Harmonious Meeting: The McClain DecLion and the
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 311, 317-19 (1986). For a detailed
analysis of CPIA in conjunction with other related national laws, see generally Rosecrance, supra,
and Ann Guthrie Hingston, U.S. Implementation of the UNESCO Cultural Property Convention,
in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note 29, at 129.
185. Rosecrance, supra note 184, at 335; see aiso Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church
of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d. 278 (7th Cir. 1990). This case
involved a replevin action for the return of four Byzantine mosaics over 1400 years old which
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This history of recognizing the necessity to preserve and protect objects of
cultural, archaeological, historic, artistic, and religious significance, combined
with recent information regarding the extensive pillage of American cultural
heritage (especially Native American cultural heritage), has prompted the
United States to finally begin to take action to protect its own cultural
property." The discussion that follows shows how current law is applied to
actively protect the cultural heritage of Native Americans, specifically to
prevent unauthorized and unwanted trafficking and export.
B. L2ws Applied to Protect Cultural Property
1. National Stolen Property Act
The National Stolen Property Act (NSPA)" is one general, federal,
criminal law that has been successfully applied to prosecute theft of cultural
property. It applies to persons who knowingly transport or possess stolen
property worth at least $5,000 and involved in interstate or foreign commerce.
Penalties are a fine of not more than $10,000, ten years imprisonment, or
both."89 The two primary cases prosecuted under NSPA have both involved
had been stolen from the Church in 1979 by vandals. The mosaics were purchased by the
defendant for over $1 million from an art dealer who purportedly found them amidst rubble.
Under both Indiana and Swiss law the church retained valid title to the mosaics, enforceable in
U.S. faderal court for their return. Id. at 291. Judge Cudahy, in his concurring opinion,
specifically applied CPIA to this case. He challenged the judiciary to "attempt to reflect in its
decisionmaking the spirit as well as the letter of an international agreement to which the United
States is a party.... [T]he policy that [CPIA] embodies is clear: at the very least we should not
sanction illegal traffic in stolen cultural property that is clearly documented as belonging to a
public or religious institution." Id. at 296-97 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Furthermore, he reasoned
that the mosaics should be returned to the Church both because the Church is "their rightful
owner" and "as a reminder that greed and callous disregard for the property, history and culture
of others cannot be countenanced by the world community or by this court." Id. at 297.
186. The Cultural Advisory Committee recently completed a report of findings and
recommendations based on ten years of the CPIA. The Committee recommends that the
government increase diplomatic pressures, Congress amend the CPIA, U.S. Customs Service
provide stronger training programs, and the Committee support educational programs. ADVISORY
COMMITrE, supra note 37, at 3.
187. See Cowley, supra note 89, at 58.
18:3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1988 & Supp. 1 1990). For a thorough analysis of NSPA,
relevant cases, and CPIA, see Rosecranee, supra note 184. Crimes to cultural property may also
be pro ecuted under other general criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) (embezzlement and
theft), id. § 1361 (destruction of government property or malicious mischief), id. § 1163
(embezzlement and theft from Indian tribal organizations), and id. § 371 (conspiracy to commit
offense or defraud the States). CAROL CARNETr, NATL PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, TECHNICAL BRIEF NO. I 1; LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL REsOURCES
PROTECTION 4 (1991).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988). "Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or
foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise ... of value of $5,000 or more, knowing the
[Vol. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/2
No. 1] PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
imported, stolen cultural property."n NSPA is difficult to apply because of
its strict scienter requirement that persons involved in the crime know that the
property in question is in fact stolen. 9' Defendants need not, however, know
that their activities with this stolen property constitute interstate commerce.'9
It is this scienter requirement that was central to the controversial holdings
in the United States v. McClain cases, in which the defendants illegally
exported pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico and imported them into the
United States. 93 The defendants argued that applying NSPA to foreign
exports violated constitutional due process for vagueness: potential offenders
could not be expected to be familiar with foreign theft laws. However, "[t]he
court reasoned that the statute's specific scienter requirement eliminates the
possibility that a defendant is convicted for an offense he could not have
understood to exist."''1
Furthermore, the court explained that "a declaration of national ownership
is necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered theft,
and the exported article considered 'stolen', within the meaning of
[NSPA]."'95 This declaration of national ownership must be definitive:
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud .... " Id. "Whoever receives, possesses,
conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise ... which have
crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken,
knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken .... 18 U.S.C. § 2315
(1988 & Supp. 111990).
190. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. MeClain,
545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (McClain I); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.
1979) (McClain I1).
191. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-2315 (1988 & Supp. 111990); Houseman, supra note 108, at 544,
546. "Knowingly" applies both to the prohibited activities and the status of the property as stolen;
thus, NSPA defines a specific intent crime because it requires knowledge of illegality - it is the
status of the property as stolen that makes the activities prohibited.
192. EDWARD J. DEVITTr ET AL., 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 17.02, at 617-18 (4th ed. 1987).
193. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (McClain I); United States v.
McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) (McClain I1). This case has two decisions: first the court
remanded the case for ajury decision based on appropriate jury instructions, then the court finally
decided to overturn the conviction because the Mexican government failed to definitively declare
national patrimony until 1972. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1003-04; McClain II, 593 F.2d at 670-71.
For criticism and argument over the case, see, e.g., Douglas C. Ewing, What Is "Stolen"? The
McClain Case Revisited, in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note 29, at 177; Rosecrance, supra note
184.
194. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 665.
195. McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1000-01. The court further stated that United States v.
Hollinshead supports the "conclusion that a declaration of national ownership suffices to render
an illegally exported item 'stolen.'" Id. at 1001 n.28. In Hollinshead, the defendant was
successfully prosecuted under NSPA for importing a known and recorded pre-Columbian stela
from Guatemala into the United States. The court stated "that it was not necessary for the
government to prove that appellants knew the law of the place of the theft" but only that they
knew the stele was stolen; because there was no question on this point, defendants were found
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"[NSPA] cannot properly be applied to items deemed stolen only on the basis
of unclear pronouncements by a foreign legislature.""' Thus, McClain
concludes that where a foreign country declares national ownership over
cultural property, and this property is subsequently illegally exported from the
country, the property will be considered stolen when imported into the United
States, and NSPA may be used to prosecute this theft. But export regulations
alone, without a definitive state declaration of ownership, will not render this
same imported property "stolen" under NSPA.'"
State declarations of ownership of cultural property are often referred to as
umbrella statutes and generally include claims to discovered and undiscovered
artifacts.' A nation's claim to ownership is based solely on these
legislative, self-declarations of ownership, not on possession or mere export
regulations."9 "[T]he United States' ability to declare national ownership and
subsequently prosecute dealers in Indian artifacts under the NSPA is
analogous" to the holding in McClain that validated Mexico's right to claim
ownership over pre-Columbian artifacts.'n
However, the United States has not as yet passed an umbrella statute
protecting all cultural property as national patrimony, nor has it applied NSPA
at home." One commentator suggests that "[t]he limited scope of United
States' antiquity laws might be explained by the fact that there is a sufficient
domestic market for Indian artifacts such that umbrella statutes, designed to
prevent the export of antiquities, are unnecessary." ' Clearly, this is no
guilty. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1974). Interestingly, some
of the defendants in McClain I1 "knew Hollinshead and were aware of his conviction ... 
McCkin 11, 593 F.2d at 659 n.I.
196. McClain 11, 593 F.2d at 671.
197. McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1002-03; see also Jonathan S. Moore, Enforcing Foreign
Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 471-76 (1988) (discussing
umbrella statues, NSPA, and common law replevin).
Illegal export alone may be sufficient to cloud the title on an imported object, thus preventing
any sale to reputable art institutions or dealers. Id. at 483.
198. Moore, supra note 197, at 470 & n.25.
199. McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1002.
200. Moore, supra note 197, at 481. To clarify, while the McClain Ii court overturned the
conviction, they clearly held that Mexico's declaration of ownership is valid; the conviction would
have held had Mexico enacted a clear declaration of national ownership earlier. McClain iI, 593
F.2d at 670-71.
201. There have been no cases tried under NSPA regarding interstate trafficking or illegal
export of American cultural property. This may be the result of politics. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan proposed an amendment to NSPA which would have excluded cultural property from
enfomcment under NSPA. Moore, supra note 197, at 476-77; see also Ellen Herscher, The
"McClain Override" Bill, S.605: Hearings Held, 12 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 469-77 (1985). This
amendment did not pass nor is it likely that a similar one would pass in the future. Perhaps there
has been a conscious effort by law enforcement not to use NSPA for cultural property, since there
are now other applicable statutes, as discussed infra, making such an amendment unnecessary.
202. Moore, supra note 197, at 481 n.80.
[Vol. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/2
No. 1] PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 35
longer true, given the current information regarding foreign interest in Native
American artifacts, increasing export of these artifacts, and widespread pillage
of Native American and other archaeological sites within the United
States.'
2. Archaeological Resources Protection Act
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) specifically
addresses preservation and protection of archaeological resources.' It has
been the primary statute used to prosecute illegal activities harming cultural
property since its enactment in 1979 .a ARPA explicitly defines its purpose
as "to secure, for the present and future benefit of the American people, the
protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and
Indian lands .... '" This purpose is based on Congressional findings which
concluded that:
(1) archaeological resources on public lands and Indian lands
are an accessible and irreplaceable part of the Nation's heritage;
(2) these resources are increasingly endangered because of their
commercial attractiveness; [and]
(3) existing Federal laws do not provide adequate protection to
prevent the loss and destruction of these archaeological resources
and sites resulting from uncontrolled excavations and pillage..
27
In 1993, at the time of this writing, these findings still present an accurate
picture of the fate of cultural property, but the situation is improving. ARPA
does cure significant problems with the Antiquities Act. It offers an effective
mechanism for prosecution of trafficking in cultural property separate from
NSPA. But ARPA also has problems concerning effective protection of
Native American artifacts specifically.'
One of the primary criticisms of ARPA concerns the definition of
"archaeological resource."' The term is defined as "any material remains
203. Constance Lowenthal, The Best Countriesfor Selling Stolen Art, ARTNEWS, Oct. 1992,
at 158; Sugarman, supra note 4, at 80; Cowley, supra note 89, at 58.
204. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, as amended in 1988, 16 U.S.C. §
470aa-mm (1988). For a discussion of the legislative history and 1988 amendments to the ARPA,
see Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158; Annetta L. Cheek, Protection ofArchaeological Resources
on Public Lands: History of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, in PROTECInNG THE
PAST, supra note 32, at 33.
205. Unfortunately, actual convictions and sentences under ARPA are "not impressive."
Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 61 & n.96.
206. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (1988).
207. Id. § 470aa(a)(1)-(3).
208. See Blair, supra note 82, at 143.
209. Hutt, supra note 167, at 136-37.
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of past human life or activities which are of archaeological interest" and "at
least 100 years of age.' 10 While this term has not been declared
unconstitutionally vague like the terms in the Antiquities Act, still ARPA's
"archaeological resource" does not offer sufficient protection to Native
American artifacts.21' Native Americans view the importance of an item by
its cultural, religious, or historical significance rather than its age. For
example, a forty year-old sacred Zuni War God, essential to Zuni religious
practices, would not be protected under ARPA.1 Furthermore, ARPA, like
the Antiquities Act, includes human remains in the definition of
"archaeological resource." This definition is insulting because it fails to
recognize deceased ancestors as human beings, but instead continues to label
them as resource materials. 13
ARPA does, however, recognize the special rights of Native Americans to
access their artifacts and includes them in regulated procedures. For example,
when permits are issued to excavate on Indian lands, the individual or
tribe'" controlling the land must approve the permit. When permits are
210. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l) (1988). For more detailed definitions of terms, see the 1984
Uniform Regulations of ARPA, 18 C.F.R. § 1312.3 (1992); 32 C.F.R. § 229.3 (1993); 36 C.F.R.
§ 296.3 (1993); 43 C.F.R. § 7.3 (1993).. The legislative history indicates that "only artifacts of
true archaeological interest will be considered 'archaeological resources."' 125 CONG. REC.
S14,719, S14,722 (1979) (testimony from Mr. Hatfield). Note that ARPA's "material remains"
includes more objects than the Antiquities Act's "objects of antiquities"; however, ARPA's
limitation that these remains be of "archaeological interest" excludes some objects of antiquities
covered by the Act. Furthermore, ARPA limits protected remains to those "at least 100 years of
age" while the Act has no age limitation (although this lack of definition caused the Act to be
declared unconstitutional in the 9th Circuit). Northey, supra note 10, at 76; United States v. Diaz,
499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
211. "mhe primary legal attacks on ARPA have concerned the definition of 'archaeological
resource.'" Kristine Olson Rogers & Elizabeth Grant, Model State/Tribal Legislation and Jury
Education: Co-Venturing to Combat Cultural Resource Crime, in PROTECTING THE PAST, supra
note 12, at 47, 48 (quoting Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 70); see also United States v.
Austin, 902 F.2d 743, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 874 (1990). Austin was
convicted for eight counts under ARPA and appealed, claiming that ARPA is "unconstitutionally
vague." Ild. at 744. Austin's challenge failed, and the court held that ARPA is neither
unconstitutionally overbroad nor vague. Id. at 744-45. "The statute provided fair notice that it
prohibited the activities for which Austin was convicted." Id. at 745.
212. Blair, supra note 82, at 143.
213. See Hutt, supra note 167, at 136-37; Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 42-43.
214. When statutes refer to Indian tribes, it is important to remember that these tribes are
sovereign nations and should be treated as such. For a discussion of Indian sovereignty, see
INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 97.
In a government publication, an archaeologist for the Bureau of Indian Affairs optimistically
declares, "[t]he Federal government is encouraging tribes to assume responsibility for their own
affairs. Relations with tribes are government to government. When a Federal agency engages in
archaeology on Indian lands, its dealings with tribal governments are much like those with state
or municipal governments, but not entirely." Donald R. Sutherland, Federal Archaeology in
Indian Country, C.R.M. BULL., July 1988, at 19. The author acknowledges that agencies "must"
consider Native American religious concerns in archaeological permitting procedures on all lands.
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issued to excavate on public lands, notice must be given to Indian individuals
or tribes whose religious or cultural interests might be affected by the
activities authorized by the permit."5 Furthermore, ARPA requires that
agencies consult with Indian tribes and consider the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)216  while writing the Uniform
Regulations.217
AIRFA states that it will be the policy of the U.S. government to protect
and preserve freedom of religion by "access to sites, use and possession of
sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites."'2  While Native American involvement in ARPA
procedures is necessary to provide proper protection for their cultural heritage,
the involvement provided for is still not enough. The forty year-old Zuni War
God, an essential object to Zunis' freedom to worship (theoretically protected
by AIRFA219), is not protected by ARPA.
ARPA protects archaeological resources located on public and Indian lands
and whenever a state or local law is violated. Public and Indian lands
include all lands owned or administered by the federal government and lands
of Indian tribes or individuals held in trust by the federal government or
However, then the author describes Native American concerns for protection of artifacts as
"mundane." He claims, "[i]n general, apart from sacred beliefs, Indian attitudes towards Federal
archaeology differ little from those of any other American citizen. They range all the way from
indifference to a full fledged desire to be in charge." Id.
This short article typifies the obstacles Native Americans face in attempting to gain
governmental protection for their cultural patrimony. Like the author, the government and many
Americans do not understand the native perspective. Native religious beliefs are inseparable from
native culture. DELORIA, GOD Is RED, supra note 52, at 247. Native Americans are hardly
indifferent to preserving their archaeological artifacts since these objects represent the future of
their heritage. See Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 36. Native American tribes do not
merely desire to be in control, but as sovereign nations, they have the right to self-government.
INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 97, at 33-39. In the words of Wilma Mankiller, Principal Chief of the
Cherokee Nation, in 1991, "I believe that the rights of tribes... are inherent, and that when we
talk about our rights as tribal people, we should be talking about the rights we have had since
time immemorial ...." Tribal Sovereignty, 18 NARF LEGAL REV. I (Native American Rights
Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Winter/Spring 1993, at 1 (vol. 18, no. 1).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c), (g)(2) (1988). Northey, supra note 10, at 110.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
217. 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a) (1988).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). AIRFA does not create any private rights of action or other
mechanisms to enforce this sweeping policy declaration. Boyles, supra note 118, at 1127. For
discussions concerning application of AIRFA, see id. (regarding sacred sites); EchoHawk, supra
note 98, at 451-52 (regarding museum rights to sacred objects).
219. AIRFA is only a statement of governmental policy, it creates no legally enforceable
rights. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988). See
discussion supra part III.B.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988); Blair, supra note 82, at 143.
221. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (1988). For a more detailed discussion of land and ownership issues,
see infra part V.
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"subject to a restriction against alienation."'m ARPA protects archaeological
resources on public or Indian lands from all excavation, removal, and damage
conducted without an ARPA permit or in violation 'of any other federal
law.'m
Additionally, ARPA protects archaeological resources involved in interstate
or foreign commerce if these resources were obtained in violation of state or
local law,m provided the law violated is related to the general protection of
objects (for example, theft, trespass, or conversion laws).' The ARPA does
not limit protection to resources located on public and Indian lands; therefore,
resources on state or private lands are also protected by ARPA if involved in
interstate or foreign commerce and obtained in violation of state or local
law.'m
The major provisions of ARPA provide for the issuance of permits for
authorized excavation of archaeological resources and imposition of penalties
for unauthorized excavation and trafficking. Agencies issue permits for all
authorized excavation, removal, and associated activities affecting
archaeological resources from public or Indian lands.m Conversely, ARPA
prohibits: (1) unauthorized or attemptedm unauthorized excavation, removal,
damage, alteration, or defacement of any archaeological resource located on
public lands or Indian lands; (2) trafficking in archaeological resources
obtained in violation of ARPA or any other provisions of federal law; and (3)
2:2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa(b), 470bb(4) (1988).
223. Id. §§ 470cc(a)-(b), 470ee.
224. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988). The statute specifically speaks to archaeological resources
.excavated, removed, sold, purchased, exchanged, transported, or received in violation of any
provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit in effect under State or local law." Id.
225. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1993). The state or local law
need not be expressly directed toward protection of cultural property because "[a] law that
comprehensively protects the owner of land from unauthorized incursions, spoilations, and theft
could well be thought to give all the protection to be buried antiquities that they need.. ." Id.
Therefore, violations of state or local theft, trespass, or conversion laws would trigger application
of ARPA. Id.
2 26. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988). The nature of the state or local law violated is irrelevant
- any violation is sufficient to trigger application of ARPA. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1116.
227. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ce-470gg (1988). For a thorough and detailed analysis of ARPA, see
Northe y, supra note 10.
228. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (1988).
229. Id. § 470ee. Congress specifically amended ARPA to prohibit the "attempt" to excavate,
remove, damage, alter, or deface archaeological resources because they wanted to make it possible
to prosecute looters before actual damage is inflicted upon the resources, thereby affording greater
protection and encouraging enforcement of the law. S. REP. No. 566, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3983,3986 (statement of William L. Rice, Deputy Chief,
Forest Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric.); CARNErr, supra note 188, at 9. However, Congress failed to
define "attempt." Rogers & Grant, supra note 211, at 48.
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trafficking in interstate or foreign commerce in archaeological resources
obtained in violation of any state or local law.'
Criminal "trafficking" under ARPA includes sale, purchase, exchange,
transport, receipt, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange protected
archaeological resources." ARPA does not expressly prohibit "export" of
cultural property. However, because the prohibition on trafficking is expressly
applied to foreign commerce, this provision acts as a limitation on export to
the extent the activity is defined as illicit trafficking. Thus, ARPA does
provide the first significant limitations to freedom of export.z
An ARPA crime is a general intent crime requiring the defendant to
"knowingly" perform prohibited activities. 3 That is, the defendant must
only have the intent to excavate or remove archaeological resources, not the
intent to perform an illegal activity. And, the defendant need not know the
object he is removing is an "archaeological resource" under ARPA. This
crime is easier to prosecute than specific intent crimes (like those under
NSPA) which require that the defendant intended to break the law. The
"knowing" mental state does not apply to every element of an ARPA crime,
however. "'Knowingly' refers to the actions of the person, and [ARPA] was
designed only to punish those that knowingly excavated, removed, or
otherwise defaced any archaeological resource .... [K]nowledge that the
person was on public [or Indian] land at the time of the offense is not an
essential element of the offense," but is only a jurisdictional element not
requiring any mental state.' Likewise, the provision triggering ARPA when
any state or local law is violated is jurisdictional, provided the defendant has
the required mental state of the applicable state or local law to indeed be in
violation of it.
ARPA provides for both felony and misdemeanor prosecutions and
penalties are serious. If the commercial value of the archaeological resource
involved in the crime plus the cost of restoration and repair is under $500,
and it is the defendant's first offense, then the crime is a misdemeanor:
maximum penalties are one year imprisonment, a fine of $100,000, or both.
230. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a)-(c) (1988).
231. Id. § 470ee(b)-(c). 'It takes little imagination to see how ARPA might be made the
basis for a nationwide system of export controls indistinguishable from those in other nations."
1 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, VIsuAL ARTS, supra note 15, at 75 (emphasis added). Unfortunately,
ARPA does not take this extra step of establishing comprehensive export regulations. But
prohibiting illicit trafficking is an important first step for effective cultural resource protection.
232. Merryman, supra note 183, at 851 n.74.
233. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d); H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979), reprinted
in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1709, 1714.
234. United States v. Kohl, No. 85-10044, slip op. at 5 (D. Idaho Feb. 13, 1986). There was
no question in this case that the defendant excavated archaeological resources. He claimed,
however, that be did not know he was on public land. The court held that ARPA places the
burden of making sure the law is not violated on the person who chooses to engage in activities
prohibited by ARPA. I. Therefore, the defendant was convicted. Id. at 6.
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However, if it is a second offense or the value plus restoration and repair is
over $500, then the crime is a felony: maximum penalties are five years
imprisonment, a fine of $250,000, or both. '  In addition, ARPA provides
for forfeiture of all vehicles and equipment used in connection with any
prohibited activities.' The government may further assess a civil penalty
against an ARPA violator. The amount of the penalty is related tQ the
commercial value of the archaeological resource plus the cost of restoration
and repair. Subsequent offenses may double the penalty. 7
Significantly, ARPA does not distinguish between archaeological resources
obtained illegally before or after its date of enactment (1979)." ARPA
contains no "grandfather" clause exempting archaeological resources illegally
excavated prior to 1979 from criminal trafficking prohibitions."
Consequently, resources obtained in violation of any existent law, federal,
state, or local, are protected by ARPA to the extent they are involved in
criminal trafficking. For example, resources obtained in violation of the
Antiquities Act prior to 1979 are still protected by ARPA if they are
trafficked, even in the Ninth Circuit where the penalty provisions of the
Antiquities Act have been declared unconstitutional.'
The legislative history indicates that ARPA is intended to be compatible
with all existing criminal laws, and criminal sanctions may be combined as
long as each law applies to the resource and activity in question. "Although
as a matter of departmental policy, we would prosecute all violations of...
[ARPA] under enforcement provisions of [ARPA], we should have the Title
18 alternative available, in case any 'loopholes' are discovered in
[ARPA. ' ' I Hopefully, by combining ARPA with other federal laws, all
avenues for illegal export of archaeological resources obtained from public
and Indian lands will be closed."z
235. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5) (1988).
236. 16 U.S.C. § 470gg(b) (1988).
237. Id. § 470ff(a).
238. Northey, supra note 10, at 80.
2:39. ARPA only exempts archaeological resources in lavful possession prior to 1979. 16
U.S.C. § 470ee(f) (1988); Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 73 (citing ROBERT COLLINS, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE MEANING BEHIND ARPA: How THE AcT is MEANT TO WORK 7 (1980)
[hereinafter COLLINS]). Collins was a drafter of ARPA.
2,10. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
241. H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1709, 1728 (letter from Patricia M. Wald, assistant attorney general). It is also worth noting that
ARPA provides for both criminal and civil penalties whichmay be aggregated. 16 U.S.C. §§
470ee, 470ff (1988); Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 80 (quoting COLLINS, supra note 239,
at 7).
242. Relevant Title 18 laws include: 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) (embezzlement and theft), Id.
§ 1361 (destruction of government property ornalicious mischief), id. § 1163 (embezzlement and
theft from Indian tribal organizations), and id. § 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or defraud
the States). CARNETr, supra note 188, at 4.
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Additionally, by combining ARPA with state and local laws, it is also
possible to limit trafficking of artifacts obtained from private and state lands.
While ARPA does not limit its jurisdiction over archaeological resources
involved in commerce to violations of state and local cultural property laws
(the statute says "any" state or local law 3), these cultural property laws
provide significant added protection to resources. One commentator who
analyzed the relevant state statutes found that:
State statutes in force as of July 1990, fall into five categories that
reinforce or complement ARPA:
1. Restrictions on sales of antiquities or forgeries (14 States);
2. Laws to discourage activities that damage archaeological
resources on private land (11 States);
3. Mirror ARPA statutes, including penalty provisions (37
States);
4. Penalties for disturbances of marked and unmarked burial
sites (11 States)... ;
5. Statutes providing for acquisition of real property or
artifacts.
244
These state statutes complement ARPA and increase protection to
archaeological resources. By providing for this combination of various
federal, state, and local laws, ARPA provides significant protection to Native
American cultural resources and effectively limits export of some of these
cultural resources for the first time in American legal history.US
ARPA does not, however, technically prohibit mere possession of illegally
obtained artifacts. This was a conscious omission by Congress to protect
"holders of archaeological resources obtained before the effective date of..
. [ARPA]." ' Congress clarified that "a person may own, possess, buy, sell,
trade or exchange archaeological artifacts if held prior to the enactment
regardless of origin or proof of ownership" provided such resources were not
243. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988); United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (7th Cir.
1993). The Gerber court limited "state or local law" to laws "related to the protection of
archaeological sites or objects." Id. at 1116.
244. CARNIIT, supra note 188, at 6. For a brief summary of each state's laws and a table
summary, see PRICE, supra note 168, at 43-115 & app.
245. Merryman, supra note 183, at 851 n.74; see 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (1988). The primary
problems will be evidentiary and enforcement: how to prove who has valid title and from what
land the artifact was excavated or removed, and how to obtain convictions for offenders. These
problems are discussed supra part V.
246. S. REp. No. 179, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979. This report accompanied Senate Bill
490, but the House bill was passed in lieu of Senate bill). See also 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(f) (1988).
Trafficking in archaeological resources obtained in violation of the ARPA permit procedures shall
not apply to "any person with respect to an archaeological resource which was in the lawful
possession of such person prior to October 31, 1979." Id. (emphasis added).
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illegally excavated or removed."l One commentator suggests that "no person
could be in [legal] possession of any artifact taken without a permit from
federal lands prior to 1979 without violating general criminal statutes and
regulations prohibiting theft and destruction of governmental property," so this
exclusion effectively omits no one.' Because ARPA incorporates all
existent laws yet contains no exemption or "grandfather" clause, 9 any
artifact excavated at any time from federal or Indian lands without permission
cannot be legally possessed' - thus, in effect, only legally obtained
artifacts may be legally possessed.
There is still a potential loophole, however. The problem regarding
possession is primarily evidentiary.' If the artifact is proven to have been
stolen, then despite any pre-ARPA possession, the current or future possessor
cannot engage in any subsequent prohibited activities with the artifact.
However, if the artifact merely has questionable title or unknown origin, then
the owner might be free to sell, transport, or export it.
Consider the consequences for one illegal possessor who lost possession
of artifacts with no recourse. Robert Wilson, a U.S. Forest Service employee,
testified on behalf of the defense in a criminal trial prosecuted under ARPA
for damage to an archaeological site.m His testimony was offered to prove
the defendants had not caused all the damage alleged, and the defendants were
acquittedY' In his testimony, however, Wilson also admitted that he had
removed artifacts from a cave on federal land prior to the enactment of ARPA
and that he still possessed some of these artifacts.m
'247. S. REP. No. 179, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1979).
248. Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 73. Robert Collins, an ARPA drafter, confirmed,
"[olne cannot have 'lawful' possession of an archaeological resource that has been taken illegally
from Federal property. Therefore, one cannot traffic in illegally obtained artifacts at any time
after the date of the enactment of... [ARPA], even though he had possession of the artifact prior
to ... [ARPA]'s passage." Id. (quoting COLLINS, supra note 239, at 6-7).
249. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
250. Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 73.
251. See infra part V.B.
252. Testimony of Robert Wilson, United States v. Barnes & Bender, CR No. 81-119-BE,
exhibit D (Or. Dist. May 1982).
253. Findings and Recommendation, Wilson v. Turner, Civ. No. 84-6503-KF (Or. Dist, Oct.
1985).
254. Testimony of Robert Wilson at D-6, D-23, D-27, Barnes & Bender (CR No.
81-1 t9-BE). Needless to say, it reflects poorly on the U.S. government when government
employees are involved in illegal looting. In 1987 another U.S. Forest Service officer was
prosecuted under ARPA for appropriating Native American pottery he found on government land.
He claimed he did not know keeping the pottery was a crime since he had not dug it out of the
ground, but rather found it uncovered. He plead guilty to a misdemeanor and was sentenced to
probation on the condition that he quit his job. Bill Ott, Judge Tells Forester Who Took Indian
Artifact To Quit His Job, SAN DIEoO UNION, Apr. 7, 1987, at B1.
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Following the trial, the U.S. Forest Service directed Wilson to return all the
artifacts in his possession to the Bureau of Land Management. 5 In return,
Wilson was not prosecuted for his ARPA violations. However, Wilson filed
a civil suit for damages against the U.S. Attorney and various federal agency
employees claiming conspiracy and deprivation of personal property and
liberty?' Wilson conceded that his artifacts were government property, but
argued that he had obtained them lawfully because the penalty provisions of
the Antiquities Act (the only cultural property law in effect at the time he
obtained the artifacts) had been declared unconstitutional in the Ninth
Circuit.'
The judge granted summary judgment against Wilson, explaining that the
federal government retains ownership rights to all artifacts on federal land.
Joint ownership is not possible. Therefore, "the government's taking of the
artifacts does not violate Wilson's Fifth Amendment rights because he had no
property interest in them."'  Likewise, any person who possesses artifacts
obtained in violation of any law at any time, has no property rights in these
artifacts, and the government may require their return. The illegal possessor
may loose possession of his artifacts at any time with no recourse, provided
it can be shown that his possession is indeed illegal. The rights of the illegal
possessor hinge on the evidence available against him regarding the origin of
the artifact possessed.
It has been suggested by some commentators that ARPA is an umbrella
statute for the United States, that it assumes national ownership over all
presently discovered or undiscovered artifacts located on or in public and
Indian lands. 9 This is not the case.' If ARPA were an umbrella statute,
this complex analysis of the body of cultural property law would be
unnecessary, because export of all cultural property would be clearly regulated
and the state of the title of the exported object would be irrelevant. To the
contrary, no definitive assertion of ownership or national patrimony exists in
the language of the statute.
For ARPA to be an enforceable umbrella statute, it would have to include
a clear pronouncement of national ownership.' ARPA does state* that
"archaeological resources which are excavated or removed from public lands
will remain the property of the United States,"' but this merely restates a
255. Findings and Recommendation at 4-5, Wilson (Civ. No. 84-6503-KF).
256. See Complaint for Damages and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wilson v. Turner,
Civ. No. 84-6503-KF (Or. Dist. Nov. 1984).
257. Findings and Recommendation at 9, Wilson (Civ. No. 84-6503-KF). For further
discussion on the Antiquities Act of 1906, see supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
258. Findings and Recommendation at 10, Wilson (Civ. No. 84-6503-KF).
259. Moore, supra note 197, at 480-88; Rosecrance, supra note 184, at 345.
260. See Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 105 n.348.
261. See id.
262. See United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 671 (5th Cir. 1979).
263. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(3) (1988). For more discussion, see Suagee, supra note 157,
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basic presumption of property law that the government is the custodian over
public lands and the resources below the surface, unless someone else holds
valid title to these resources.' ARPA does not affect ownership rights of
archaeological resources: those resources located on public lands are still
owned by the government, those located on Indian lands are still owned by
the respective Indian tribes or individuals, and those located on other lands are
still owned according to property law principles.' Even though ARPA is
not an umbrella statute, it is still an effective mechanism for protection of
cultural property. By incorporating all violations of federal, state, and local
laws involving archaeological resources into its criminal provisions, ARPA
extends protection to many archaeological resources without expressly limiting
export.
3. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
As indicated by its name, the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)' provides further protection for some Native
American cultural property and human remains by regulating ownership,
disposition, trafficking, and most significantly, repatriation of Native
American cultural property or human remains in the possession of a federal
agency or museum.' While a full discussion of repatriation is beyond the
scope of this paper, Native Americans can significantly reduce the possibility
of losing their cultural property by reclaiming as many objects as possible
under NAGPRA's repatriation provisions.' The best protection for Native
American artifacts is to keep them from being removed from Indian land; 69
once removed, the second best protection from the Native American
perspective is to repatriate them.
at 39.
264. 1 PRor & O'KEEFE, supra note 7, at 307-11. There is significant dispute over what
evidence suffices to overcome the presumption of federal ownership of cultural property
discovered on public land. See generally EchoHawk, supra note 98.
265. See ARPA Uniform Regulations: 18 C.F.R. § 1312.13(a)-(b) (1992); 32 C.F.R. §
229.13(a)-(b) (1993); 36 C.F.R. § 296.13(a)-(b) (1993); 43 C.F.R. § 7.13(a)-(b) (1993); 125
CONG. REC. 17,391, 17,394 (1979) (testimony of Rep. Udall). For a general discussion on
property law principles applied to cultural property internationally, see I PROT & O'KE IE,
supra note 7, at 306-21.
266. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. I 1990); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990).
267. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3002,3005 (Supp. 111990); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 111990); H.R. REP.
No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. 4367, 4380 (letter
from Robert D. Reischauer, director, Congressional Budget Office).
268. See 25 U.S.C. § 3005 (Supp. II 1990); Platzman, supra note 53; Francis P.
McManamon & Larry V. Nordby, Implementing the Native American Graves Protectioh and
Repatriation Act, 24 ARnZ. ST. LJ. 217 (1992); June Camille Bush Raines, Comment, One is
Missing: Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: An Overview and Analysis,
17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 639 (1992).
269. Peterson, supra note 63, at 148.
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NAGPRA is the result of a long battle by Native Americans, their tribal
governments, and the Native American Rights Fund to protect their ancestors'
graves from desecration, repatriate their ancestors' remains, and "retrieve
stolen or improperly acquired religious and cultural property."'27 NAGPRA
addresses each of these concerns in an effort "to protect Native American
burial sites and the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred
objects, and objects of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian, and Native
Hawaiian lands." '' As a result of this input from Native Americans,
NAGPRA is the first cultural property law to be written from the Native
American perspective, focusing on essential objects of cultural patrimony
rather than prohibited activities.2"
"In interpreting NAGPRA, it is critical to remember that it must be
liberally interpreted as a remedial legislation to benefit the class for whom it
was enacted." '73 In summary, 4 the major provisions of NAGPRA define
cultural property and ownership rights, inventory and summarize cultural
property possessed by federal agencies or museums, call for repatriation of
cultural property from federal agencies or museums, create a review
committee to oversee inventory and repatriation procedures, establish civil
penalties for museums who fail to comply with NAGPRA, authorize grants
to implement NAGPRA, and provide criminal penalties for illegal trafficking
in cultural property and human remains 5
NAGPRA provides detailed definitions of critical terms, namely "burial
site," "cultural affiliation," "cultural items" (including "associated funerary
objects," "unassociated funerary objects," "sacred objects," and "cultural
patrimony"),276 "Native American," "Native Hawaiian," and "right of
possession."2" These definitions are the result of input from representatives
270. Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 36; see also Henry Sockbeson, Repatriation
Act Protects Native Burial Remains and Artifacts, NARF LEGAL REV. (Native American Rights
Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Winter 1990, at I (vol. 16, no. 1); Raines, supra note 268.
271. H.R. REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4367, 4367.
272. See Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 76.
273. Id. at 76. The authors are prominent supporters of NAGPRA, involved in the legislative
drafting and negotiating processes. Mr. EchoHawk is Senior Staff Attorney with the Native
American Rights Fund in Boulder, Colorado. Mr. Trope was formerly Senior Staff Attorney for
the Association on American Indian Affairs in New York, New York, and continues to represent
clients on Indian matters. Id. at 35.
274. For more detailed analyses of NAGPRA and related issues, see Trope & EchoHawk,
supra note 160 (regarding background and legislative history); Platzman, supra note 53 (regarding
repatriation from museums); Marsh, supra note 64 (regarding protection of archaeological sites).
275. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. 11 1990); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990).
276. NAGPRA carefully distinguishes between human remains and funerary objects (25
U.S.C. § 3001(3) (Supp. 11 1990)), thereby curing a major criticism of both the Antiquities Act
and ARPA, that is, lack of respect toward deceased ancestors' remains. Hutt, supra note 167, at
136-37; Troe & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 42-43.
277. 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (Supp. 111990). For the purposes of this chapter, the term -
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of Congress, Native Americans, and the art community."' Understanding
these definitions is crucial to understanding NAGPRA because like all the
cultural property laws discussed herein, NAGPRA only protects its
specifically defined items. The legislative history explains:
(1) "burial site" means any natural or prepared physical location, whether
originally below, on, or above the surface of the earth, into which as a part of the
death rite or ceremony of a culture, individual human remains are deposited.
(2) "cultural affiliation" means that there is a relationship of shared group
identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between a
present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an indentifiable
earlier group.
(3) "cultural items" mean human remains and
, (A) "associated funerary objects" which shall mean objects that, as a part
of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to have
been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or
later,... except that other items exclusively made for burial purposes or
to contain human remains shall be considered as associated funerary
objects,
(B) "unassociated funerary objects" which shall mean objects that, as a
part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to
have been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death
or later,... and the objects can be identified. . . as related to specific
individuals or families or to known human remains or... as having been
removed from a specific burial site of an individual culturally affiliated
with a particular Indian tribe
(C) "sacred objects" which shall mean specific ceremonial objects which
are needed by traditional Native American religious leaders for the practice
of traditional Native American religions by their present day adherents, and
(D) "cultural patrimony" which shall mean an object having ongoing
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American
group or culture itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native
American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or
conveyed by any individual regardless of whether or not the individual is
a member of the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and such
object shall have been considered inalienable by such Native American
group at the time the object was separated from such group...
(13) "right of possession" means possession obtained with the voluntary
consent of an individual or group that had authority of alienation.... The original
acquisition of Native American human remains and associated funerary objects
which were excavated, exhumed, or otherwise obtained with full knowledge and
consent of the next of kin or the official governing body ... is deemed to give
right of possession to those remains ....
Id. For discussion on the definitions, see Platzman, supra note 53, at 517-21; Trope &
EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 61-68.
278. For legislative history on the definitions, see H.R. REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
14-15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367,4373-74; S. REP. No. 473, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-9 (1990); 136 CONG. REc. H10,985, H10,988, H10,990-91 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990); 136
CONG. REc. S17,173, S17,176 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
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This legislation does not include every basket, every pot and
every blanket ever made by Indian hands. It refers to human
remains, funerary objects, and only the most sacred of religious
items which were taken from a tribe without permissionY9
These definitions do not include objects which were created for
a purely secular purpose, such as for sale or trade in Indian art.
The definitions include objects which are necessary for the
continuing practice of native American religion, funerary objects
and objects that are of central cultural importance to the tribe such
that they cannot be owned, alienated or conveyed by any
individual. The scope of these definitions is a very limited one.
In this way the bill provides adequate protections to native
American grave sites while still allowing private collectors to
pursue their pastimes.'
Significantly, NAGPRA, unlike ARPA, contains no age requirement in its
definitions of cultural items, but rather defines them from the Native
American perspective based on personal and sacred value. ' This
perspective specifically addresses the problems surrounding the Zuni's efforts
to reclaim their War Gods and protects all significant cultural and religious
objects.' Still, the definitions carefully exclude objects "created for purely
a secular purpose, including the sale or trade in Indian art" in an effort to
avoid any unnecessary adverse impact on Native American art trade.' (In
this way, NAGPRA is consistent ideologically with the Indian Arts and Crafts
Act of 1990, discussed infra.) Thus, the definitions are precise enough to
avoid the vagueness problems of the Antiquities Act, inclusive enough to
sufficiently protect Native American cultural heritage, and still exclusive
enough to allow benign art trade to flourish' z
NAGPRA specifically provides for native ownership of human remains and
cultural items. In this sense, it is the closest of American laws to an umbrella
statute; however, NAGPRA is not technically an umbrella statute because it
vests ownership of cultural property and human remains in Native Americans,
not the federal government. All human remains and cultural items excavated
279. 136 CONG. REC. HI0,985, H10,988 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (testimony of Rep.
Campbell). NAGPRA protects human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural
patrimony. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(3), 3002(c) (Supp. I 1990); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990).
280. 136 CONG. REC. S17,173, S17,176 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (testimony of Sen.
McCain).
281. Hutt, supra note 167, at 142.
282. 136 CONG. REc. S17,173, S17,177 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (testimony of Sen.
Domenici).
283. S. REP. No. 473, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990).
284. Platzman, supra note 53, at 543-44; S. REP. No. 473, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990).
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or discovered on federal or tribal lands after the enactment of NAGPRA,
November 16, 1990, are owned by Native. Americans, either the lineal
descendants, the tribe occupying the land, or the tribe with the closest cultural
affiliation. 5 Excavation or removal of human remains or cultural items
from federal or tribal lands requires a permit issued in accordance with ARPA
and proof of consultation or consent from the appropriate Indian tribe.2"
Like ARPA, NAGPRA prohibits illegal trafficking in protected cultural
property.' Criminal offenders of NAGPRA may receive maximum
penalties of one year in prison, fines of $100,000, or both for the first offense
and five years in prison, fines of $250,000, or both for subsequent
offenses."s NAGPRA specifically prohibits the knowing sale, purchase, use
for profit, or transport for sale or profit of any "human remains of a Native
American without the right of possession to those remains" or "any Native
American cultural items obtained in violation of [NAGPRA]." '25 Human
remains are distinguished from other cultural items in these trafficking
provisions.' The provisions regarding trafficking in cultural items pertain
only to objects prospectively acquired in violation of NAGPRA; consequently,
trafficking of cultural items is prohibited only to the extent the items were
originally removed from federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990,
without an ARPA permit or tribal consent."' Added protection, however, is
285. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)-(b) (Supp. II 1990).
286. Id. § 3002(c).
287. Tribes actively protest the sale, auction, and marketing of Native American artifacts by
the major art auction houses. In response, some auction houses give a percentage of the proceeds
from these auctions to Native American foundations. Nevertheless, these monetary grants do not
curtail this "licit" trafficking in Native American cultural property and Native Americans arc not
satisfied. Marsh, supra note 64, at 103.
288. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. If 1990). Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 73. One
commentator suggests that NAGPRA's prohibitions will probably not dramatically reduce looting
and trafficking. Looters and pothunters are driven by greed, and enforcement mechanisms are not
effective enough to provide sufficient deterrence. What is needed is a strategy "that chokes off
the lucrative market." Marsh, supra note 64, at. 131.
289. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. II 1990).
290. Id. § 1170. This distinction is the result of compromise negotiations in the legislative
process. The civil provisions provide full protection to both human remains and cultural items;
however, some protection for cultural items was sacrificed in the criminal provisions in order to
guarantee full protection in the civil repatriation provisions. As a result, when it is not possible
to s-accessfully prosecute a NAGPRA offense to cultural items criminally, prosecutors should look
to civil penalties. Telephone Interview with Walter R. EchoHawk, Senior Staff Attorney, Native
American Rights Fund, in Boulder, Colo. (Mar. 3, 1993). See 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990);
25 U.S.C. §§ 3002-3005, 3007 (Supp. 111990).
291. See Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 73-74; 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990);
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001(3), (13), 3002(c) (Supp. 11 1990). The provision describing "intentional
removal from or excavation of Native American cultural items from Federal or tribal lands"
permits such activity only with (1) an ARPA permit, (2) tribal consultation or consent, (3)
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given to human remains. NAGPRA prohibits trafficking in all wrongfully
acquired human remains, "regardless of when and where obtained, including
those removed prior to the enactment of NAGPRA."'  This broad protection
prohibits trafficking in all human remains acquired without the right of
possession from all lands, including state and private lands. Thus, human
remains are contraband to all wrongful possessors. NAGPRA is the first law
to extend significant protection to human remains located on private and state
lands without a requirement that the remains be involved in interstate
commerce, as required by ARPA. 3
Criminal trafficking under NAGPRA is a general intent crime and requires
that the offender "knowingly" perform the prohibited activities. 4
"Knowingly" should apply only to the prohibited activities and not the lack
of right of possession, which conversely should be viewed only as a
jurisdictional requirement.' The right of possession is intended to be
292. Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 73.
293. Hutt, supra note 167, at 142; see 18 U.S.C. § 1170(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 16 U.S.C. ,§
470ee(c) (1988). It is very important to carefully determine first what type of object is in
question, human remains or other cultural items, and then to look at the applicable prohibitions.
One commentator inaccurately combined the differing provisions and concluded that the
NAGPRA bans trafficking of both human remains and cultural items obtained at any time without
the right of possession. Leonard D. DuBoff, Protecting Native American Cultures, OR. ST. B.
BULL., Nov. 1992, at 9, 11-12. This is misleading and overinclusive because trafficking of
cultural items is only banned if the items were prospectively obtained in violation of NAGPRA.
18 U.S.C. § 1170(b) (Supp. 111990).
The same commentator further concluded that NAGPRA does not restrict excavation or
transfer of items acquired from private land. DuBoff, supra, at 12. By a technical reading of the
statute this is true, but it is also misleading. Human remains acquired from private land without
the right to possession may not be sold, purchased, used for profit, or transported for sale or
profit. 18 U.S.C. § 1170(a) (Supp. If 1990). Presumably, it will be rare that a person acquire
remains for purposes other than the prohibited activities. But, like ARPA, NAGPRA does not
extend to prosecute persons who do indeed merely possess these remains or give them away as
pure gifts. Hutt, supra note 167, at 145. Gifts exempt from criminal liability create no financial
incident or benefit, Id. For example, a transfer between museums for exhibit or study causes no
liability, but a donation for which a charitable income tax deduction is taken does cause liability.
And, whenever, by whomever, human remains are trafficked or otherwise used for financial
benefit, the parties involved may be prosecuted. d.
Protection from excavation and transfer of other cultural items, however, does not extend to
private and state land because the applicable trafficking provision only pertains to items acquired
in violation of NAGPRA (rather than items acquired without the right to possession, that is,
without tribal consent). NAGPRA only prohibits excavation and removal from public and tribal
lands without an ARPA permit and tribal consent after the date of its enactment. 18 U.S.C. §
1170(b) (Supp. 11 1990); 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
294. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990).
295. Confusingly, there is a statement in the legislative history that implies that "knowingly"
should apply also to the lack of right of possession. "As is consistent with current Federal
criminal law, the term 'knowingly' . . . refers not only to anyone who 'sells, purchases, uses for
profit, or transports for sale or profit,' but also to those without the right of possession." 136
CONG. REc. H10,985, H10,989 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (testimony of Rep. Campbell). However,
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"similar to the transfer of title to other forms of property... consistent with
general property law."' The Antique Tribal Art Dealers Association (a
stroDng.opposer to NAGPRA) suggests that the trafficking provisions do not
provide sufficient protection to bona fide purchasers. However, given the
express importance of legal excavation of cultural property, it is likely that
"courts may hold that all purchasers have notice and buy at their own risk
unless proper inquiry regarding the provenance of the artifact is made."'
In the words of a museum curator, "Unless you're naive or not very bright,
you'd have to know that much ancient art is stolen.""8 Furthermore, it is an
accepted legal principle that defendants may not avoid guilty knowledge in
order to escape prosecution.' Thus, it is likely that courts will consider
if the mental state is applied to the lack of right of possession, the crime becomes a specific intent
crime (more difficult to prosecute successfully), not a general intent crime, because the defendant
would be required to have knowledge of illegality.
Additionally, applying the mental state requirement to both elements of the crime is illogical
because "right of possession" is only an element of illegal trafficking of human remains, not other
cultural items. Therefore, while NAGPRA extends more protection to human remains by not
restricting acquisition prospectively from its enactment date, this interpretation would make the
crime more difficult to prosecute by converting the crime into a specific intent crime requiring
a knowing mental state of the status of ownership rights to the remains.
Furthermore, all other federal cultural property laws create general intent crimes (contrary to
the substantive effect of the quoted statement). Thus, to actually be consistent with the body of
cultural property laws, the "right of possession" must be a jurisdictional requirement only and
therefore not subject to the same mental state requirement. United States v. Kohl, No. 85-10044,
slip op. at 3-4 (D. Idaho Feb. 28, 1986) (explaining the jurisdictional analysis in detail). Many
general federal criminal laws, like NSPA, are specific intent crimes (usually signalled by the word
.willful"); however, the purpose of cultural property laws is to offer added protection to cultural
property, especially by lowering mental state requirements to encourage successful prosecutions
and offer more deterrence.
296. 136 CONG. REC. S17,173, S17,176 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (testimony of Sen.
Moain).
297. DuBoff, supra note 293, at 13. Consider the advice given by the court in dicta to
dealers in a recent case involving an international transaction to purehase stolen mosaics (tried
under a state replevin law):
[W]e should note that those who wish to purchase art on the international market,
undoubtedly a ticklish business, are not without means to protect themselves....
[D]ealers can (and probably should) take steps such as a formal IFAR search; a
documented authenticity check by disinterested experts; a full background search of
the seller and his claim of title; insurance protection and a contingency sales
contract; and the like.
Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc,, 917
F.2d 278, 294 (7th Cir. 1990).
298. MEYER, supra note 15, at 123 (quoting John D. Cooney, curator of ancient art at the
Cleveland Museum, Mar. 1972).
299. For commentary and criminal jury instructions regarding Deliberate Ignorance, see I
EDWARD J. DEVIT Er AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INsTRuCnONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
§ 17.09 (4th ed. 1992). For civil jury instructions regarding Duty of Inquiry, see 3 EDWARD
DEvrrr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 72.07 (4th ed. 1987).
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traffickers to have knowledge of the status of ownership rights whenever they
fail to properly investigate the provenance of cultural items or human remains.
It is Congress' intent that NAGPRA be implemented in combination with
other laws'0 to curtail the black market in Native American cultural
property. Specifically, NAGPRA is intended to be "fully consistent" with
ARPA. 0' NAGPRA actually protects more cultural property than ARPA
because most likely any object that qualifies as an archaeological resource will
also qualify as a cultural item, but the converse is not necessarily true because
of ARPA's 100 year-old age requirement.' Therefore, archaeological
resources are protected by both NAGPRA and ARPA trafficking provisions
and penalties may be combined - traffickers may face fines, imprisonment,
and forfeiture of vehicles. ARPA's catch-all trafficking provisions apply
to all archaeological resources obtained in violations of any federal, state, or
local law. Thus, cultural property over 100 years old and of archaeological
and cultural interest receives extensive protection under the law, while
property less than 100 years old receives slightly less but still significant
protection."'
Since NAGPRA addresses sale, purchase, and transport of cultural
property, it, like ARPA, acts as an effective limitation on export. The
legislative history indicates that NAGPRA is intended "to prevent the
interstate sale of Native American remains,"'  but foreign sale is not
discussed. Because transfer is not expressly included in the prohibited
activities, a potential loophole exists for cultural items or human remains to
be given away as pure gifts to persons or institutions outside the United
States.3"
Hopefully, by combining NAGPRA, ARPA, and other federal laws
governing stolen property or property lacking valid title (like NSPA), potential
loopholes for trafficking in all Native American cultural property will be
closed. The only qualification for simultaneous prosecution is that the cultural
property in question fall within the scope of definitions of each criminal
statute.' The combination of ARPA and NAGPRA offers the most
300. NAGPRA also works in combination with NHPA regarding, for example, discovery of
human remains and cultural items recovered during archaeological investigations and undertakings
conducted under NHPA. For more information, see Memorandum from Robert D. Bush,
Executive Director, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, to State and Federal Historic
Preservation Officers (July 3, 1991), reprinted in 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 505 (1992).
301. S. REP. No. 473, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1990).
302. See 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l) (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (1988).
303. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(b)-(d) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990).
304. See 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990).
305. H.R. REP. No. 877, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4367, 4382 (letter from Robert W. Page, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), and C.
Edward Dickey, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Civil Works)).
306. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. It 1990). See discussion supra note 293.
307. Hutt, supra note 167, at 141.
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effictive and extensive limitation on export of cultural property. Effectively,
without express export prohibitions, the government has indeed significantly
regulated alienability rights and export of many important items of Native
American cultural property.
4. Indian Arts and Crafts Act
The laws discussed thus far indicate that the federal government has
gradually expanded protection of cultural property in an eff6rt to preserve
American and Native American cultural heritage, even though this expansion
has favored restrictions on alienation of cultural property instead of free
trade.a But one recently amended law indicates a contradictory position.
The Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 (IACA) intends "to promote the
economic welfare of the Indian tribes and Indian individuals through the
development of Indian arts and crafts and the expansion of the market for the
products of Indian arts and craftsmanship.""3 ' This Act, designed to expand
the market for Native American products, seems directly in conflict with
preservation and protection of Native American cultural property." '
The presence of IACA in the body of cultural property law indicates that
the federal government is engaged in a careful balancing between preservation
and free trade."' Only those artifacts that fit precisely within definitions of
applicable protectionist statutes are subject to restrictions on alienation,
leaving those artifacts not legislatively determined to be in need of protection
available for free trade. This notion is compatible with American export
303. See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa-47011 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. 11 1990); 18
U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. I 1990). See also discussions supra on ARPA and NAGPRA. "When
viewed together, [ARPA and NAGPRA] illustrate the growth of America's willingness to
recognize the rights of Native Americans to possess their cultural heritage." Platzman, supra note
53, at 537.
309. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (1988); 18 U.SC. §§ 1158-1159 (1988 & Supp. 111990). 1ACA was
originally enacted in 1935.
310. 25 U.S.C. § 305a (1988).
311. The legislative history does indicate a desire "to support the preservation and evolution
of tibal cultural activities." H.R. REP. No. 400(1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted In
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6383.
312. Cf H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1709, 1722. Explaining the language used in ARPA regarding the permit procedure
in § 470cc:
Archaeological excavation is itself a process of study that destroys the resource.
Because of this, and because archaeological resources are finite and non-refinable,
the objective should be to manage these resources for their long-term conservation
while at the same time allowing the necessary consumption of them in the interests
of advancing knowledge about the past or to illustrate or interpret to the public
and the human history of this nation. The purpose ... is to strike a balance
between this generation's consumption and of the archaeological resources on
Federal lands and the conservation of these resources for future generations ....
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theory discussed in part I. By keeping some objects available for trade, the
black market for art may be controlled, and the government will have a
greater chance for successful protection of true objects of cultural heritage.3
Furthermore, with IACA, the government may protect both consumers and
Native Americans by ensuring that those Indian objects available for trade are
in fact genuine and the proceeds from sales indeed benefit Indian tribes rather
than commercial counterfeiters.? 4
Specifically, IACA calls for the creation of the Indian Arts and Crafts
Board to perform eleven specified duties concerning Indian products,
including: market research into the best opportunities for arts and crafts sales,
technical research and experimentation, loan recommendations to further arts
and crafts production and sales, "trademarks of genuineness and quality for
Indian products," standards and regulations for trademarks, registering of
trademarks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office free of charge, and
defense of trademarks in the courts." 5 These functions are subject to the
qualification that "nothing ... shall be construed to authorize the Board to
. deal in Indian goods."
3M6
One significant deficiency of IACA concerns the lack of definition of
"Indian product"; IACA calls for this term to be defined by agency
regulations, but no such regulations have been written yet.317 Legislative
drafters were conscious of potential overbreadth concerning regulated
activities which might offer offenders a constitutional defense,318 but likewise
the Board must carefully define those objects subject to regulation to avoid
constitutional vagueness." 9
IACA provides for both civil and criminal penalties for persons who
counterfeit or falsely represent Indian products. The criminal penalties are
313. See BATOR, supra note 50, at 42-43. Granted, the intent of IACA is "to prevent the
passing off of non-Indian produced goods as Indian produced." H.R. REP. No. 400(1), 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6389 (letter from Carol T.
Crawford, Assistant Attorney General). IACA does encourage authentic Indian produced goods
to remain on the market, but by limiting the counterfeit market it is possible that the value of
authentic goods will increase and the black market will thrive as well.
314. H.R. REP No. 400(l), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6382, 6383-84. Counterfeiters are annually "siphoning an estimated $40 to $80 million from the
genuine manufacturers' markets." Id, at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6384.
315. 25 U.S.C. §§ 305, 305a (1988).
316. Id. § 305a.
317. Id. § 305e(d)(2).
318. H.R. REP. No. 400(l), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6382, 6389-90 (letter from Carol T. Crawford, Assistant Attorney General).
319. See United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974). IACA can be distinguished
from cultural property law in general because it is aimed at contemporarily produced Indian arts
and crafts. However, without a proper definition for Indian product, a potential offender could
argue that the 40-year-old Zuni War God or the four-year-old Apache mask are Indian crafts,
whose sale should be promoted, rather than cultural property deserving protection.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
especially serious: a maximum $250,000 fine, five years in prison, or both for
the first offense, and a maximum $1,000,000 fine, fifteen years in prison, or
both for subsequent offenses."z IACA requires knowing conduct for the
crmes of counterfeiting and misrepresentation of Indian products."'
Therefore, these are general intent crimes (like ARPA and NAGPRA) and
only require offenders to have the intent to perform the prohibited activities.
Throughout the entire history of IACA, since its original enactment in 1935,
no. violations have ever been prosecuted. The severe penalties cannot deter
offenders until they are effectively enforced. Unfortunately, the Board's next
budget contains no money for the expanded duties granted under the 1990




It is difficult to reconcile all the laws effecting cultural property. American
export theory indicates a desire to encourage free trade, but the government
is also concerned with preserving and protecting cultural heritage. It is this
conflict of ideologies that causes the body of cultural property law to be
complex and confusing. Central to every dispute over cultural property is an
evidentiary question concerning the state of its title or provenance. 3 In
general, when a possessor holds legal title to an object, he is free to sell,
transfer, transport, or export the object, interstate and internationally.
As will be discussed in part V, however, ownership of Native American
cultural property is a complex question.3 Many Native American objects
possessed by non-Native Americans have questionable title at best. If title to
cultural property is retained by Native Americans, and they desire protection
and preservation for the property, then the government should, and it clearly
is attempting to, enforce restrictions on alienability sufficient to protect the
property regardless of negative effects on free trade.
However, this may not be enough to ensure that valuable cultural heritage
is not lost. American laws only protect wrongfully obtained artifacts;
therefore, objects that cannot be proven to have been wrongfully obtained are
320. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158-1159(1988 & Supp. 11 1990); 25 U.S.C. §§ 305d-305e (1988). Note
the severity of these penalties compared to penalties under ARPA and NAGPRA. See supra notes
235-36, 288 and accompanying text. Civil penalties include injunctive or other-equitable relief,
treble damages, and punitive damages. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)-(b) (1988).
321. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1159(b) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). The prior version of § 1159
required willful conduct for the crime of misrepresentation of Indian products. The amendments
changed the crime from specific intent (like NSPA) to general intent, thus making it easier to
prosecute. 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
322. DuBoff, supra note 293, at 14.
323. See id. "The new laws place a premium on the knowledge of the provenance of Indian
art and artifacts." Id. However, "[n]o transfer of title or deed comes with the purchase of fine
American Indian art or historic antiquities discovered on public lands. Instead, dealers provide
... provenance, or information on the origin of the article. Sometimes it is issued in writing,
more often not."' Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 84.
324. See generally EchoHawk, supra note 98.
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without protection. The time has come for Congress to offer additional
protection for cultural property by enacting definitive, express export
restrictions to protect all important (culturally, religiously, historically, and
scientifically important, as defined by the significant interested parties)
American and Native American cultural heritage regardless of provenance. In
this manner, all legal loopholes for potential loss would be closed and the
future of American cultural heritage would be preserved.
This article will now turn to a discussion of the major problems concerning
application of our cultural property laws, that is, evidentiary problems related
to ownership rights and enforcement problems. The first step is to enact laws
that protect valuable cultural property, and the second step is to ensure that
these laws indeed effectuate this necessary protection.
V. Application
ARPA and NAGPRA provide significant and effective national protections
for cultural property and offer some limitations to export. Under these laws,
however, it is essential to determine from where the cultural property in
question was excavated (public, Indian, or private land) because these land
differentiations result in different protections under the laws. Especially for
Native American cultural property, ownership presumptions based on location
may not be accurate. Thus, Native Americans may need to prove their
ownership rights to cultural property. Additionally, application of ARPA and
NAGPRA is hampered by insufficient and incompetent enforcement. Needless
to say, these enforcement mechanisms need to be immediately improved so
that our laws will provide real protection for cultural property, not merely
idealistic policy statements.
A. Ownership Issues
1. Public and Indian Lands
Both ARPA and NAGPRA provide significant protection to cultural
property excavated from public or Indian lands. Each law, however, uses
slightly different terminology to describe essentially the same types of land.
Regarding public or federal lands, ARPA defines "public lands" as lands
owned and administered by the federal government as part of the national
park, wildlife refuge, or forest systems, plus all other lands to which the
government holds fee title.3" NAGPRA defines "federal lands" as all lands,
other than tribal lands, owned and controlled by the government."
Regarding Indian or tribal lands, ARPA defines "Indian lands" as lands of
Indian tribes or individuals held in trust by the government or subject to a
325. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(3) (1988).
326. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(5) (Supp. 11 1990).
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restriction against alienation imposed by the government." 7 NAGPRA
defines "tribal lands" as all lands within the exterior boundaries of any Indian
reservation and all dependent Indian communities." Especially since ARPA
and NAGPRA may be applied in combination, and since a violation of
NAGPRA will trigger ARPA trafficking provisions as a violation of any
federal law,3 ' potential problems created by these different land descriptions
should disappear. Violations to cultural property that occur on land falling
within any one of the land categories should trigger full federal protection.
Specifically, ARPA protects archaeological resources located on public or
Indian lands from any excavation, removal, damage, alteration, or
defacement?3" Furthermore, ARPA protects archaeological resources
excavated or removed from public or Indian lands in violation of any federal,
state, or local law against trafficking.3 ' Likewise, NAGPRA provides
protections against trafficking and illegal excavation or removal to cultural
items on federal or tribal lands, and additionally to human remains on all
lands."
One primary distinction between ARPA and NAGPRA, however, concerns
ownership rights to cultural property excavated from public and Indian lands.
Under ARPA, archaeological resources excavated or removed from public
lands "remain the property of the United States." '333 Native Americans
merely have the right to be'notified when an ARPA permit for excavation is
issued which may harm a religious or cultural site." ARPA does not grant
Native Americans the right to claim ownership to cultural property excavated
from public lands, even though some of this property might be their cultural
patrimony. On Indian lands ARPA provides that excavation permits may only
be issued with Indian consent and in accordance with any conditions requested
by Indians.33 Even on Indian lands, however, ARPA does not vest
ownership rights in Native Americans."
Conversely, NAGPRA does specifically vest ownership and control of
Native American human remains and cultural items excavated or discovered
327. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(4) (1988).
328. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (Supp. I 1990).
329. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(b) (1988); 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c) (Supp. 11 1990).
330. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a) (1988).
331. Id. § 470ee(b)-(c).
332. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Supp. 11 1990); 25 U.S.C. § 3002(b) (Supp. 11 1990).
333. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(3) (1988).
334. Id. § 470cc(c).
335. Id. § 470cc(g).
336. Tribal laws regulating ownership rights to cultural resources excavated from Indian
lands should be valid; however, many tribes have not enacted such laws. Thus, courts may look
to federal common laws as supplementary authority for answers to any ambiguities in federal laws
regarding ownership rights to cultural property. Ralph W. Johnson & Sharon 1. Haensly, Fifth
Amendment Takings Implications of the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, 24 ARrz. ST. L.J. 151, 166-67 (1992).
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on federal or tribal lands in Native Americans.337 At last our law
acknowledges the inherent right of Native Americans to own their cultural
patrimony, at least when it is located on public or Indian lands. And, since
ARPA incorporates all other existent laws into its trafficking provisions, and
NAGPRA is the most recent cultural property law,338 ownership questions
should be resolved in accordance with NAGPRA.
2. Private and State Lands
Protection for cultural property on private and state lands is more limited
than on public and Indian lands. Neither ARPA nor NAGPRA explicitly
provides protection to cultural property on private and state lands, but in
application their protections do, in limited circumstances, extend to these lands.
ARPA prohibits trafficking in archaeological resources obtained in violation of
any federal, state, or local law?39 Additionally, NAGPRA prohibits trafficking
in all Native American human remains without a right of possession, regardless
of where the human remains were buried.' Thus, on private and state lands,
human remains are fully protected under the law, but other cultural property
must have been involved in some type of criminal activity, a violation of state
cultural property laws or other general laws, in order to trigger federal
protections.
Recently in United States v. Gerber,"M Judge Richard Posner, writing for
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, explained that in order for a
violation of state or local law on private land to trigger application of ARPA,
the violation must be "related to the protection of archaeological sites or
objects." 2 However, application is not so limited that only violations of state
or local cultural property laws trigger ARPA, rather violations of theft, trespass,
337. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (Supp. I 1990). Prior to NAGPRA, potential disputes over
ownership of cultural property on public lands was possible, although none existed on record.
For further discussion, see EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 448-51.
338. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. 111990); 18 U.S.C. § 1170
(Supp. 11 1990).
339. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(b)-(c) (1988); see United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
340. 18 U.S.C. § 1170(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
341. 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
342. Id. at 1116. During construction of a highway on private land, workmen discovered a
site now known as the Hopewell burial mound. One workman bulldozed an area and took the
artifacts he unearthed. For $6000 the workman sold these artifacts and revealed the location of
the site to the defendant in Gerber. Thereafter, the defendant returned to the site and excavated
hundreds of artifacts. The defendant admitted to committing criminal trespass and conversion and
to transporting some of the artifacts in interstate commerce. Id. at 1114. The defendant was
convicted of a violation of 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c) (1988).
On appeal the defendant argued that either § 470ee(c) does not apply to the archaeological
resources removed from lands other than federal or Indian lands or it is only triggered by
violations of state or local cultural property laws. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113. The Gerber court
rejected both of these arguments. ld. at 1116-17.
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or conversion laws would also be sufficient. "A law that comprehensively
protects the owner of land from unauthorized incursions, spoliations, and theft
could well be thought to give all the protection to buried antiquities that they
need." ' 3 Thus Gerber clarifies that when a wrongdoer enters another's private
land and removes or excavates archaeological resources, ARPA may be applied
against the wrongdoer. However, no court has applied ARPA against a
landowner who excavates cultural property from his own land.
Traditionally, American property law vests ownership of everything beneath
or on the surface of private property in the landowner. Consequently,
landowners have legally removed Native American artifacts from their land and
sold them to collectors or museums& Most landowners do not believe it is
looting to dig up a grave in their own backyard and then keep or sell the burial
artifacts. Thus, it is the concept of the sanctity of private property that makes
full protection and preservation of cultural property so problematic.'
One solution is that private archaeological organizations attempt to purchase
important sites located on private lands in order to preserve the resources." 7
Additionally, in Arkansas, the state legislature annually appropriates money
to fund a group of professional archaeologists who perform research on recorded
sites, counsel amateurs, and lecture the public. This group has been very
successful at involving the public in protecting their archaeological sites;
however, a primary obstacle is still the sanctity of private land. According to
an administrator, "Landowners still have control over their land, and there's no
way that making a righteous plea about preserving the past is going to get
through to everybody."'
State laws may offer additional protections to cultural property,3" but not
all states have chosen to enact such laws. Just over half the states in America
prohibit private landowners from excavating unmarked burial grounds on their
343. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1116-17.
344. Id. "IThere is no right to go upon another person's land, without his permission, to
look for valuable objects buried in the land and take them if you find them." Id. at 1116.
345. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 445. For a general discussion on international finders
laws, see 1 PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 7, at 306-21.
346. See Harrington, Looting, supra note 29, at 24.
347. Herscher, supra note 111, at 118.
348. Kentucky also has an effective archaeological preservation program. See A. GWYNN
HENDERSON, KENTUCKY NATURE PRESERVES COMMISSION, THE KENTUCKY ARCHAEOLOGICAL
REGISTRY: CmzEN-BASED PRESERVATION FOR KENTUCKY'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES (1988).
The Kentucky Archaeological Registry provides protection to archaeological sites through
education, citizen involvement, and management assistance. Outstanding citizen commitment is
recognized by personal awards. ld. at v.
349. Harrington, Looting, supra note 29, at 25.
350. For a discussion of model state cultural property legislation and cites to many state
cultural property laws, see Rogers & Grant, supra note 211. For a summary of each state's grave
and burial laws and a summary table, see PRICE, supra note 168, at 43-115 & app.
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private property?" Some states regulate the sale or purchase of artifacts,
others prohibit activities causing damage to artifacts, and still others regulate
public health and thereby extend protection to cultural resources?'
A primary obstacle to laws providing more extensive protections to cultural
property on private lands is that these laws may violate the Takings Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.353 Many of the state
laws which do extend some protections to private land are relatively new and
have not yet been tested in the courts?' Native Americans argue that they
were forced to leave their lands and move to reservations by the United States
government. Subsequently, their lands passed to private landowners, and now
their sacred burial grounds are being desecrated and their patrimonial objects
scattered throughout the world 55 Native Americans never abandoned their
sacred objects; thus, private landowners may obtain possession but not valid
title?' Without valid title to cultural property, landowners have no Fifth
Amendment claims if their rights to this property are regulated or otherwise
restricted."s Additionally, the government should have a duty to protect Native
American cultural property since they forced Native Americans to leave this
property behind, unprotected against ignorant or insensitive future
landowners.35
B. Evidentiary Issues
While NAGPRA does finally vest ownership rights to cultural property on
federal and tribal lands in Native Americans, " ownership disputes will likely
still abound. The law fails to clearly define ownership rights to cultural property
excavated prior to NAGPRA's date of enactment in 1990 or excavated from
private and state lands. Thus, in order to protect and preserve cultural property
currently in the possession of non-Native Americans, Native Americans may be
forced to prove their ownership rights to controversial cultural artifacts.
1. Proving Ownership Without Provenance
Proving ownership rights to cultural property is problematic primarily
because no documentary evidence of title is required for possession or transfers.
351. Harrington, Looting, supra note 29, at 24, 30.
352. Id. at 30; Camett, supra note 188, at 5; PRICE, supra note 168, at 43-115 & app.
353. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of NAGPRA and its takings implications, see Johnson &
Haensly, supra note 336; PRICE, supra note 168, at 38-39.
354. Harrington, Looting, supra note 29, at 30.
355. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 446.
356. Johnson & Haensly, supra note 336, at 159.
357. See Johnson & Haensly, supra note 336, at 156-59.
358. See Sen. Pete V. Domenici, Preface B, in PROTECTING THE PAST, supra note 32, at v,
vi.
359. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (Supp. 11 1990).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
Therefore, provenance is the only potential evidence'of an object's history and
ownership rights.' However, even provenance may be difficult to obtain
because dealers, auction houses, and museums rarely obtain or disclose such
information. And, when provenance is disclosed it is often incomplete
because, according to custom, as few questions as possible are asked to avoid
uncovering undesirable information about art and artifacts." t It is precisely
this hidden and avoided "undesirable" information that in many cases would
prove that Native Americans still retain valid title to their cultural property,
regardless of who has possession.
Recently Sotheby's put three ceremonial masks up for auction in New York
City. Prior to the auction, both the Hopi and Navajo tribes requested that
Sotheby's withdraw these objects because of their cultural and religious value.
The Navajos explained, "any sale of sacred paraphernalia of Native Americans
is highly disrespectful and a major assault in the destruction of Native
American religion."' a Yet, based on a "business decision," Sotheby's refused
the tribes' requests and sold the masks. The tribes could not use NAGPRA to
initiate legal action because the masks were excavated and purchased prior to
1990. In their defense, Sotheby's emphasized that neither tribe had made a
claim of ownership to the masks.' However, the tribal art specialist did
state that in the future Sotheby's will "require sellers of such masks to provide
proof of purchase or, if none exists, to sign an affidavit stating that the objects
had not been bought from a museum."' Fortunately, this story has a happy
ending: the purchaser of the masks decided to return them to the tribes, their
rightful owners'
In this situation, it would be difficult for the Native American tribes to
prove their ownership over the masks. There is no available provenance, and
the seller was anonymous - these are common obstacles. However, Native
Americans do have some persuasive arguments. First, if Native Americans
can prove that the object in question was stolen, then title remains vested in
the original Native American owner.' However, proving theft may be an
360. Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 84-85.
361. BATOR, supra note 50, at 84 & n.146; ADvIsORY COMMIT'rE, supra note 37, at 25.
362. Three Indian Masks Sold, DAILY SPECrRM (St. Georges, Utah), May 25, 1991 (on file
with the American Indian Law Review).
:363. Id.
364. Rita Reif, Buyer Vows to Return 3 Masks to Indians, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1991, at
CI I. Dealers often require sellers to sign printed forms declaring that purchased objects were
obtained from private land. In this manner, "a seller involved in illegal activities furnishes the
proof of a 'legitimate' transaction" to protect the buyer. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 121-22.
365. Reif, Buyer Vows, supra note 364, at Cll; Woman Plans to Return Masks, DAILY
SPECTRUM (St. Georges, Utah), May 25, 1991 (on file with the American Indian Law Review);
Rita Reif, With Indian Art, the Exhibit Could Be In Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1991, § 2, at 37.
366. Peterson, supra note 63, at 132; Moore, supra note 197, at 471; Lowenthal, supra note
203, at 158. This is the basic principle in common law countries. However, in civil law countries,
bona fide purchasers obtain good title and there are statutes of limitations to restrict recovery
[Vol. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/2
No. 1] PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 61
insurmountable barrier. 7 In such situations, Native Americans may
alternatively be able to prove the object in question is inalienable property of
the tribe, or that the property was neither abandoned nor transferred by them.
In each of these situations, the tribe retains ownership rights. The following
subparts discuss these alternative arguments.
2. Proving Ownership Through the Nature of the Property
When using the nature or status of cultural property as a basis to prove
ownership rights, it is initially important to identify what type of cultural
property is under dispute: human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects,
cultural patrimony, or other cultural property. Human remains and funerary
objects are treated differently than other types of cultural property. Generally,
under common law they are "quasi property," and descendants have limited
property interests to ensure reinterment.6 Therefore, unless possessors are
descendants of the deceased person, from whose grave the funerary objects
were excavated, technically they lack ownership interests in the objects.3"
Native Americans who can prove they are lineal descendants retain the
ownership interests. However, many objects cannot be traced back to a
specific individual's grave; therefore, there is no opportunity for Native
Americans to show a direct lineal relationship and thereby claim ownership
over disputed objects.37
For sacred objects and cultural patrimony, Native Americans retain
ownership rights because the objects are communal property of the tribe.37" '
This would most likely be the best argument for the masks. Regardless of
whether this communal property was originally sold by an individual Native
American or stolen, the Native American tribe retains ownership rights.
Communal property is not ordinary personal property. It is owned collectively
by the entire tribe, and no one individual member has the right to sell, trade,
or give it away.' It is inalienable unless the tribe as a whole gives
from bad faith purchasers. Id.
367. Leo J. Harris, From the Collector's Perspective: The Legality of Importing
Pre-Columbian Art and Artifacts, in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note 29, at 155, 160.
368. Johnson & Haensly, supra note 336, at 156.
369. Id. at 156-57; PRICE, supra note 168, at 23-24; EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 447-48,
450 ("[W]e cannot agree that ownership of [burial goods] may be acquired by reducing them to
possession ... when and if removed, [these objects] rightfully belong to the descendants if they
be known." (quoting Charrier v. Bell, Civ. No. 5552 (20th Jud. Dist. La., Mar. 18, 1985), affd,
496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986))).
370. Native American tribes may be able to claim ownership by showing only distant
kinship. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 450. The court in Charrier did not require the Tunica tribe
to show a "perfect 'chain of title."' The tribe satisfied proof of descent because they were "an
accumulation of the descendants of former Tunica Indians." Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 604
(La. Ct. App. 1986).
371. For a good discussion on communal property, see Moustakas, supra note 115.
372. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 441-42; Johnson & Haensly, supra note 336, at 158-59.
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permission to transfer title and relinquishes their rights. Therefore, present
possessors will rarely, if ever, have valid title to sacred and patrimonial
objects because title remains always vested in the tribe, absent express
evidence to the contrary?'
For Native American cultural property that is neither funerary objects nor
sacred or patrimonial objects, property rights are governed by tribal laws.
Such cultural property may be sold or given away by an individual Native
American provided he has the right to convey good title under tribal law."'
Therefore, if the masks fell into this final category of cultural property, it is
unlikely that the Native American tribes would be able to sufficiently prove
their ownership interests without an express tribal law clarifying the property
rights.
'5. Proving Ownership Through Lack of Abandonment
Another argument for Native Americans pertains to all types of cultural
property and is based on the concept of abandonment. As previously stated,
landowners generally have ownership rights to everything found on or in their
land;ns however, this principle does not apply when the found property was
never abandoned by its previous rightful owner. Abandonment only occurs
when an owner voluntarily and intentionally relinquishes all property and
ownership rights to property without vesting these rights in another person.""t
The property in question must have been deserted with the intent to
abandon?' It is likely in disputes over ancient artifacts that a court might
assume the objects were abandoned.37 However, Native Americans have a
persuasive explanation. Since they were forcibly removed from their lands by
the United States government, they did not voluntarily and intentionally leave
their cultural property; therefore, the property is not abandoned, and they
retain rightful title."'
In a case between the Tunica Tribe and an amateur archaeologist to resolve
ownership rights to Tunica burial objects excavated from personal property
with the landowner's permission, the court concluded that the goods were not
abandoned and that Tunicas still retained good title because the tribe had
relinquished immediate possession of the goods for only religious, moral, and
spiritual purposes."m The court explained, "the fact that the descendants or
fellow tribesmen of the deceased Tunica Indians resolved, for some
customary, religious or spiritual belief, to bury certain items along with the
373. Suro, supra note 19, at Al. Zuni war gods are classic examples of communal property.
:174. EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 443.
375. 1 PRor & O'KEEE, supra note 7, at 309.
376. Johnson & Haensly, supra note 336, at 159.
377. 1 PRorr & O'KEEFE, supra note 7, at 318.
'178. Id. at 310.
:179. See EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 446.
180. Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601, 604-05 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
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bodies of the deceased, does not result in a conclusion that the goods were
abandoned.""3 ' In order to abandon their artifacts, the Tunicas must have
relinquished their possession with the intent to allow the first finder to
acquire rights to the artifacts.3" In accordance with this case, most Native
Americans will also be able to show that their burial goods were only
relinquished for religious purposes; therefore, abandonment is not applicable
and the tribe retains ownership rights to the objects.
4. Unequal Positions in Commercial Transfers
Often in cases where there is evidence that Native Americans transferred
cultural property to non-Native Americans, the perceptions of the parties
involved in the transactions are vastly different. Historically, transfers were
predominantly one-way - from Native Americans toward non-Native
Americans. Over time Native Americans lost tremendous amounts of their
cultural property in these unequal trades." An historian describes the
commercial practices:
[T]he entire process can also be viewed as an unequal trading
relationship, the product of a colonial encounter in which, in the
long run, the terms of trade were stacked in favor of those who
were part of the dominant economic system, tilted toward those
whose economic system generated a surplus of the cash upon
which all had come to depend. The Indian economy's own
surplus, not inconsequential, was most often expended upon
conspicuous status consumption, upon blankets, pans, flour,
sewing machines, and other trade goods.3"
Often Native Americans did not interpret transfers as freely negotiated
because they were a subjugated people. Exchanges and sales were not
transactions with which Native Americans were familiar. Although the
market is a recognized and revered institution in American life, there was
no functional equivalent in Native American life. Native Americans often
did not understand the finality of the transactions which resulted in
invaluable cultural losses.3" It seems vastly unfair to withhold invaluable
cultural patrimony from Native Americans based on such questionable
transfers.3"
381. Id. at 604.
382. Id. at 605.
383. Trope & EchoHawk, supra note 160, at 43-44; DOUGLAS COLE, CAPTURED HERITAGE:
THE SCRAMBLE FOR NORTHWEST COAST ARTIFACTS 310-11 (1985).
384. COLE, supra note 383, at 311.
385. Robert Adams, Smithsonian Horizons: Repatriation of Native American Remains and
Artifacts, SMITHSONIAN, Oct. 1990, at 10.
386. When museum records exist for Native American art, these records often indicate that
the property was purchased or given to the museum. However, because of the questionable nature
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5. Widespread Falsification
A. final evidentiary dilemma to consider when attempting to prove
ownership rights to cultural property is the prevalence of fake artifacts and
falsified documentation in the art world. Sotheby's tribal art specialist
estimates that of the artifacts he sees from Mississippi, 80% are fakes,
Another dealer generally warns that there are more fake artifacts than there
are genuine artifacts on the market.3 Furthermore, according to one
museum curator, 95% of ancient artifacts in the United States are smuggled
goods. Another museum curator adds that 90% of the certificates of origin
for ancient artifacts are unreliable." While the exact percentages are
subject to much dispute in the art world, it is apparent that falsification
proliferates. Furthermore, this falsification is known throughout the art
business and is arguably routine practice.3 Overall, it is best to always
investigate the authenticity of documentation and artifacts.
Proving ownership rights to Native American cultural property is clearly
problematic; however, due to the lack of available provenance and the
abundance of falsified documentation, Native Americans' best arguments are
those that rely on the status of the objects, explaining that title to certain
cultural objects remains indefinitely with lineal descendants or the tribe.
Ideally the burden should rest on third parties rather than on Native
Americans to prove ownership rights," especially for patrimonial objects.
Perhaps as the revolutionary civil repatriation provisions of NAGPRA are
acted upon, arguments in favor of Native American ownership rights will
gain acceptance and proof of ownership will be a less problematic issue.
C. Enforcement Problems
The final major problem hampering the effective application of all
cultural property laws is the general inadequacy of enforcement
mechanisms. Yet, without effective enforcement, our laws offer no
deterrence to criminals and little protection to cultural property. According
to one commentator, "the scale of the enforcement effort is so modest that
it is like countering a forest fire with a water pistol."39 ' Insufficient
of many purchase transactions, museums should bear the burden of proving their ownership.
EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 441.
387. Harrington, Buying and Selling, supra note 46,.at 29.
388. MEYER, supra note 15, at 123-24; see also Moore, supra note 197, at 470 n,22.
389. MEYER, supra note 15, at 123-24.
390. See EchoHawk, supra note 98, at 441.
391. MEYER, supra note 15, at 150. Even though this quotation is twenty years old, it still
an accurate depiction. See also Sugarman, supra note 4, at 120 (stating that, according to a U.S.
Forest Service archaeologist, "It's like having a city with a million people and one policeman.
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manpower and financial resources exist to adequately police archaeological
sites, and furthermore, looting often occurs at previously unknown sites.3"
1. Inadequate Surveillance
In America, even when the location of sites is known, patrolling them is
nearly impossible due to the large number of sites located on vast and rugged
terrain.393 In the Southwest, the region with the highest rates of destruction,
one ranger estimates that on every square mile of land there are two
archaeological sites. Yet, he alone polices a region equal to the size of the
state of Delaware." In fact, in the entire Southwestern region, including
eight states approximately equal to one-fifth the entire United States, there are
only ten Forest Service agents to police the abundant destruction.395 A
further complication is that for some known endangered sacred sites constant
surveillance, if even possible, would disrupt Native American tradition.3"
2. Lack of Judicial Deterrence
Not surprisingly, there are very few prosecutions for crimes to cultural
property and sites. In the above-mentioned ranger's region in 1987, 100 cases
of vandalism were reported, but there were no criminal prosecutions.3" In
fact, as of 1990 only 58 cases total had been prosecuted under ARPA, and
only 11 of these resulted in jail sentences. Even in these 11 cases, however,
punishments were insignificant: the longest jail sentence was eighteen
months.39 Not only is it difficult to obtain enough evidence to prosecute an
artifact trafficker, but once at trial, courts do not seem sympathetic to the
cause. According to an Assistant United States Attorney, "many of the judges
don't feel that looting is such a bit deal. They don't understand why taking
pots off the land is so important."'39 Yet, without serious action from the
courts, the laws have no deterrent effect.
Consider the events surrounding United States v. Jones.' U.S. Forest
Service agents arrested three pothunters they observed digging Native
392. Moore, supra note 197, at 470.
393. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 26. Criminals may also tempt guards
to permit prohibited activities with large bribes because the potential trafficking profits are much
higher than one guard's salary. BATOR, supra note 50, at 36.
394. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 84.
395. Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 66.
396. Mason, supra note 19, at 14.
397. Sugarman, supra note 4, at 84.
398. Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 68; Sugarman, supra note 4, at 82.
399. Kane, supra note 73, § 3, at 13. One judge sentenced an admitted pothunter, caught
with over $2 million worth of stolen artifacts, to only probation when ARPA permitted as much
as $20,000 in fines and 10 years in prison. Goodwin, supra note 4, § 6 (Magazine), at 88.
400. Kane, supra note 73, § 3, at 13.
401. 449 F. Supp. 42 (D. Ariz. 1978), rev'd, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 105 (1980).
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American artifacts on federal land. Because ARPA had not yet been enacted
and the Antiquities Act had been declared unconstitutionally vague in the
Ninth Circuit, the pothunters were indicted under NSPA. The defendants
moved to dismiss the indictments and the court granted the dismissal,
concluding that Congress intended the Antiquities Act to be the exclusive law
for enforcement of crimes against cultural property.' This ruling left the
Ninth Circuit with no means by which to prosecute prohibited acts against
cultural property. Fortunately, the court realized its error and reversed the
ruling one week prior to the enactment of ARPA.
Following the enactment of ARPA, a new trial was set. The pothunters,
however, anxious to avoid the new strict penalties of ARPA, negotiated plea
bargains. One pothunter received six months in prison, probation, and a $1000
fine; another, one year in prison (the maximum for a misdemeanor) and a
$1000 fine; and the third, one and one-half years in prison (the longest
sentence given under ARPA) and a $1000 fine.'
In another case, United States v. Barnes & Bender,; three pothunters
were caught in the act of digging Native American artifacts on federal land.
At trial, however, in order to prove the defendants had not caused all the
alleged damage to the site, the defense submitted evidence from numerous
witnesses who also admitted to digging at the site. One particularly damaging
witness was a U.S. Forest Service agent.'a The case quickly turned into a
trial of government employees. In his closing argument, the defense attorney
explained, "It's the professional archaeologists and the government experts and
the agents of the government and the police and law enforcement community
against the people who go out and dig and explore and want to learn about
archaeology on their own."' Even with strong evidence that defendants had
indeed violated ARPA, the defendants were acquitted and the judge even
returned the Native American artifacts to them over pleas of outrage from
Native Americans.'
3. Lazck of Financial Resources
Agencies rightfully argue that they do not have sufficient financial support
to provide adequate enforcement. Often low annual budgets only provide
4C2. Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 66-67.
403. United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1979); Rogers, Visigotlh, supra note 158,
at 67.
404. Rogers, Visigoths, supra note 158, at 67-68.
405. CR No. 81-119-BE (D. Or. May 1982).
406. Lynell Schalk, Operation Save: An Integrated Approach to Protecting the Past. In
PROTECTING THE PAST, supra note 32, at 209,209-11. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying
text.
407. Schalk, supra note 406, at 210.
408. ld. at 209.
409. Examples of botched enforcement efforts due to insufficient funds to provide for all the
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enough money for salaries for a few precious agents, while pothunters are
organized into professional networks 1 Criminal traffickers in cultural
property are often also involved in other profitable illegal activities, for
example, drug trafficking, burglary, alien smuggling, and native plant
trafficking4 't Utah's State archaeologist explains, "We're at war and we
are losing. We're dealing with hard-core criminals, and those guys [in
Washington] think we're talking about arrowhead collectors."42 Without
the necessary support and funding from the federal government, agency
employees cannot effectively perform their jobs and protect precious
artifacts.
4. Problems for Enforcing Export Regulations
Since enforcing criminal prohibitions against trafficking in cultural
property is clearly difficult, it is likely that enforcing potential export
regulations would also be challenging. Native American cultural property
is exported out of the United States in various manners, both licit and illicit.
Legal export occurs by auctions, museum deaccessioning, and private sales
and transfers to international buyers. These legal avenues of trade are
almost wholly without regulation, yet they also result in tremendous loss of
cultural property. Consider, for example, the Native American ceremonial
masks discussed supra. The tribes had no legal recourse to withdraw the
masks from auction. Fortunately, the ultimate buyer was sympathetic to
their pleas and returned the masks to them."3 Yet, more frequently,
unsympathetic international buyers win the auction bids, and priceless
cultural objects are lost forever.
necessary details for success are embarrassing. In the 1980s 36 valuable Mimbres pots were
stolen in New Mexico After effective investigation, the FBI miraculously recovered all 36 pots
in San Francisco. The agents meticulously followed all the necessary evidentiary procedures and
then shipped the pots back to New Mexico. Upon arrival, however, it was discovered that 21 pots
had been irreparably smashed because they had been shipped in cardboard boxes, wrapped in
newspapers, and sent through U.S. regular mail without even a "fragile" label. Government
agencies now attempt to educate their agents about how to properly handle precious artifacts. Jay
Miller, How Not To Smash A Case, SANTE FE, Sept. 1988 (on file with the American Indian Law
Review.
In 1981 in New Jersey silver artifacts were stolen from a historical site. The thief was caught
and prosecuted. Logically, the court based its valuation of the objects on their recorded
appraisals. However, the appraisals were 21 years out of date so the objects' recognized value was
only a mere fraction of its actual current worth. Anderson & Spear, supra note 30, at 52.
410. Kane, supra note 73. § 3, at 13.
411. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 61.
412. Goodwin, supra note 4. § 6 (Magazine), at 66.
413. See Reif, Buyer Vows, supra note 364, at CI 1; Reif, Indian Art, supra note 365, § 2,
at 37; Woman Plans to Return Masks, supra note 365 (on file with the American Indian Law
Review).
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Auction houses and dealers protect themselves against ownership and
authenticity disputes by qualifying assertions of authenticity to avoid
liability for express warranties under state laws 42 In fact, all Sotheby's
and Christie's auction catalogues include a printed statement disclaiming all
representations or guarantees of authenticity or legality of art dated prior to
1870.' 5 Museums, dealers, and auction houses are also protected by
certificates of authenticity.4 6 However, certificates accompanying foreign
or illegally obtained artifacts are unreliable due to the common practice of
falsifying documentation. Additionally, for years our museums have refused
to return foreign cultural property, insisting that fault for the loss lies with
the country of origin which failed to adequately protect their national
patrimony. 7 Ironically, we are now left with our own words. Without
export regulations, buyers absorb all the risks and little effective protection
is granted to Native American cultural property.
Even if we did decide to regulate export, the United States currently has
no mechanisms to do so. Customs checks occur upon entering a country,
not upon exiting; therefore, the burden of enforcing export regulations falls
upon importing countries."" Unfortunately, many international countries,
including the United States, will not enforce export prohibitions unless there
is also an ownership claim to the artifact, and even then enforcement is
unlikely.4"9 NAGPRA should provide the basis for such an ownership
claim since it expressly vests ownership to Native American cultural
property in Native Americans."
Still, we should not rely on other countries to police our cultural heritage.
Our own customs finds it difficult to adequately search for illegally
imported artifacts. Customs officers are criticized for lacking the expertise
to distinguish between legal and illegal goods. Often smugglers declare low
value or misdescribe artifacts in order to make them appear as inexpensive,
recently manufactured items. In response, customs officials emphasize the
complicated, underground network of criminal traffickers.42' When false
414. Jore, supra note 5, at 74-76.
415. Charles S. Koczka, The Need For Enforcing Regulations on the InternationalArt Trade,
in WHOSE PROPERTY?, supra note 29, at 185, 192.
416. Jore, supra note 5, at 76.
417. MEYER, supra note 15, at 70.
418. Arlen F. Chase et al., Archaeology and the Ethics of Collecting, ARcnAEOLOoY, Jan.-
Feb. 1988, at 56, 87.
419. See BATOR, supra note 50, at 11; Moore, supra note 197, at 470.
420. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (Supp. I 1990).
421. John Spano, U.S. Works to Stem Flow of Contraband Artifacts, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 23,
1988, pt. 1, at 3; see Moore, supra note 197, at 472. The Cultural Property Advisory Committee
recommends that the U.S. Customs Service provide stronger training programs for its agents and
create a data retrieval system for timely access to seizure information. ADVISORY COMMIr3EE,
supra note 37, at 3, 12.
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categorization or value is discovered, however, violators may be fined the
amount of the object's true value and the object may be confiscated.4"
5. Suggestions for More Effective Enforcement
The most frequently suggested solution to assist enforcement is to educate
the public about the importance and urgency of protecting our cultural
property.4 Especially in order to increase the likelihood of guilty verdicts
in criminal prosecutions, it is essential that jurors perceive crimes against
cultural property as serious crimes with personal ramifications,424 not as
merely treasure hunting adventures. Native Americans should be involved and
visible in public education efforts so that the public may perceive the
victimization caused by cultural property crimes. Education should begin
early, even at the grade school level,4" so that future pothunters and
innocent treasure hunters are sensitive to the potential damage they could
cause. Public outreach programs may encourage citizens and amateur
archaeologists to volunteer as site watchdogs.4" "The more people gain from
a positive experience of archaeology, the more likely they will be to
ultimately embrace and support the goals of preservation.' z
Other suggestions to improve the effectiveness of enforcement efforts are
hampered by practical and financial constraints. Possibilities4= include the
establishment of a national strike force against cultural property trafficking
similar to the national campaign waged against drug trafficking.429 Or, a tax
could be imposed on imported or exported art and artifacts, with the proceeds
used to fund further enforcement efforts.43 In this way, those who benefit
422. Moore, supra note 197, at 472 n.36.
423. ADVISORY CoMMITrEE, supra note 37, at 3.
424. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 27.
425. Rogers & Grant, supra note 211, at 56.
426. Id. at 57-59.
427. Shereen Lerner, Saving Sites: Preservation and Education, in PROTECTING THE PAST,
supra note 32, at 103, 108.
428. Foreign countries' export controls, especially Canada, Great Britain, and France, may
provide model laws. See generally BATOR, supra note 50, at 37-51; Nafziger, Int'l Penal, supra
note 38, at 844-45; P.J. O'Keefe, Erport and Import Controls on Movement of the Cultural
Heritage: Problems at the National Level, 10 SYRACUSE J. INTL L. & COM. 353 (1983);
Lowenthal, supra note 203, at 158.
429. See Goodwin, supra note 4. The author estimates start-up costs at $2 million to $5
million.
430. See MEYER, supra note 15, at 119-20. In 1971 Robert Hughes of Time suggested a
"conservation tax" of 5% on every work of art sold at auction for more than $100,000. He wrote,
"'most of all, it could mitigate the crushing sense of waste and meaninglessly flamboyant
consumption that anyone who cares about art and its priorities is apt to feel when reading about
record auction prices." Id. at 119.
Another idea is a tourist tax. Any adult entering a country on a pleasure trip would pay a
nominal fee. These funds would be distributed among the country's public art institutions and an
international preservation or enforcement fund. Id. at 120.
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from the art trade would also contribute to its preservation. Another
suggestion is to establish a national register of art and artifacts.43 This idea
was recently the impetus to amendments to NHPA which appropriate money
for a report on antiquities trafficking.43 A final 33 suggestion is to establish
a customs check on exported artifacts. However, this would require express
and detailed export regulations'and appropriate agency guidance to ensure that
art trade is not unduly restricted. Export of important cultural property should
be restricted, while less important and duplicate art objects should be traded
freely, so as to not encourage the black market.
Express export regulations could be modeled after foreign regulations: the
French system is "based on a comprehensive inventory of non-exportable
property;" the British system "based on a governmental option to purchase
any object headed for export;" and the Canadian system based on a "control
list and system of export permits."'  Every system has its drawbacks, but
as the United States government balances the interests of free trade against the
protection of cultural heritage, the balance should tip in the favor of
preserving the past for future generations. If enforcement mechanisms are not
made immediately effective, there will be nothing left to protect, and the loss
will be felt by everyone.
VI. Conclusion
Aside from the technical and practical legal obstacles to effective
protection and preservation of Native American cultural property, the most
Qmiada's Cultural Property Export and Import Act (CPEIA) established a fund to purchase
important works of art to ensure their availability to the public. Furthermore, the tax incentives
in the CPEIA make it almost as attractive for a collector to donate art to a public institution as
to sell the art. Milrad, supra note 183, at 32.
Professor Bator discourages using tax incentives and charitable deductions to prevent art
institutions from acquiring illegal art. "The purpose and effect of the additional tax would be to
prohibit and to punish, not to regulate the cost of doing business ... why should we proceed by
indirec:tion? All we would be doing is to introduce a further untidy complication into the tax
code, and this on grounds having nothing to do with taxation." BATOR, supra note 50, at 87.
4"1. Houseman, supra note 108, at 554. The success of a national registry would be
dependent on full cooperation from the art community because art and all art transactions would
need to be recorded with the registry. While a registry may be satisfactory for contemporary art,
it cougd not guaranty authenticity of older art. Id.
432. NHPA Amendments of 1992. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-5 (Supp. IV 1992). For further
discussion, see supra note 173.
433. Other possible solutions may be creative penalties - fines used to fund further
enforcement, confiscated objects donated to public museums, rewards for discovering missing art,
or community service in public art institutions (e.g., for art dealer defendants). See Nafziger, Int'l
Penal, supra note 38, at 845.
424. Id. at 844. See generally Milrad, supra note 183 (discussing Canada's new law);
Fishman & Metzger, supra note 113, at 59-62 (summarizing various export laws as of the
mid-1970s).
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pervasive hindrance is public ignorance. It is difficult for non-Native
Americans to fully comprehend the value of Native American cultural
property. Mainstream American culture and religion are separable, having no
objects that are symbolic of the entire way of life.
Throughout the research for this article, the author searched for some
comparable American object to use as an example. The only one found is the
Liberty Bell.43s While many Americans would take great nationalistic
offense at the desecration, destruction, or theft of the Liberty Bell, few feel
a personal connection to the Liberty Bell and few could describe its national
significance. The Liberty Bell does not have the religious, spiritual, and
cultural significance comparable to a Zuni war god or other Native American
cultural property.
In order to understand the plight of Native Americans, Americans need to
personalize the issue. Consider, for example, how dehumanizing theft is in
general. Now imagine a treasured family heirloom, the family Bible, or the
portrait of your great-grandfather is stolen and your home ransacked. Many
years later you learn that this item was sold to an international collector and
is irretrievable due to international laws.4 How would you feel? ... This
is only one part of the loss experienced by Native Americans. Their cultural
property not only has personal and historic significance, it is also fundamental
to their religious and cultural beliefs. A senior bow priest for the Zuni Tribe
described the return of a war god: "It's like a child that has been lost, out
wandering around, finally returned to its homeland." '437
If. Americans could begin to empathize with Native Americans, then the
biggest obstacle to the cultural preservation problem would be solved.
Citizens would stop collecting artifacts for sport, report more occurrences of
archaeological site destruction, and return more guilty verdicts as jurors. So
far, however, Americans do not empathize enough to make a real difference.
As a result, the federal government must offer protection to Native Americans
through adequate laws to deter people from acting immorally and inhumanely.
Immediate governmental action is necessary to effectively preserve Native
American cultural property. Admittedly, this is a complicated issue with many
differing perspectives and competing interests. Both ARPA and NAGPRA
provide significant protections for cultural property, but these protections are
435. Merryman & Elsen, Hot Art, supra note 14, at 8. Some Americans might think that the
American Flag is an example of American cultural property, but because the American Flag is
a duplicate, mass-produced product, it is not technically cultural property. Particular, unique,
historic flags might qualify as cultural property, but the author did not find any authority that
expressly noted such flags as examples.
436. International countries that follow civil law have statutes of limitation that prohibit
recovery of stolen property: in Italy ten years, in Switzerland five years, and in Japan only two
years. After this period the original owner may not recover his property. Lowenthal, supra note
203, at 158.
437. Haederle, supra note 19, at El.
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effective only within U.S. borders. In order to ensure that cultural property
is also protected in international markets, and to avoid loss of important
patrimonial objects, we need to enact express export regulations. Native
American culture cannot survive without access to its religious and ceremonial
objects. Furthermore, all Americans will benefit from the preservation of
cultural resources, even those too ignorant to recognize the importance of
cultural preservation.
Surely, assisting Native Americans in preserving their rich and distinct
cultural heritage justifies restrictions on destruction, removal, possession,
transfer, export, and trafficking of their cultural resources, especially since
these resources are ultimately necessary to preserve that heritage and culture.
Of all who seek possession of Native American cultural resources, Native
Americans alone have the requisite personal and religious interest in
preserving the resources, but they are currently powerless to adequately
protect these objects. Without federal intervention, these resources will remain
unprotected and will ultimately be lost forever.
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